Highlighted Works by Mackinder Forum Members

• America’s Thucydidean Moment
  Athanasios G. Platias
  Modern Diplomacy
  February 4, 2026
  moderndiplomacy.eu
  
  
• From the Monroe Doctrine to the Multipolar World: How Spheres of Influence Returned in the 21st Century
  Stelios Fenekos
  Mackinder Forum
  February 6, 2026
  mackinderforum.org

Weekly Geopolitical News Bulletin (January 24-30, 2026)

Geoeconomics

• Sun Tzu in the supply chain: the “new face” of economic war with China — War on the Rocks argues that U.S.–China competition is increasingly fought through supply-chain leverage, standards, chokepoints, and industrial policy rather than tariffs alone—pushing “economic security” into boardroom risk registers. For executives, the practical takeaway is to treat tier‑2/3 supplier visibility, export-control exposure, and logistics dependencies (ports, insurers, specialized components, cloud/EDA tooling) as strategic vulnerabilities, not just procurement issues. The essay’s framing reflects a U.S. national-security lens and can underweight the commercial costs of rapid decoupling; some market-oriented analysts contend that over-securitization raises inflation and reduces innovation via duplicated ecosystems. Still, the directional signal is clear: governments are normalizing “economic statecraft,” and private firms will be pressed into compliance, reporting, and resilience investments.
  warontherocks.com
  
  
• OPEC+ reaffirms March output pause — OPEC’s official communication reaffirms that participating producers will keep the planned production pause into March, citing seasonal demand dynamics. For companies with energy‑intensive footprints, this decision matters less as a one-off “price spike” trigger than as a signal that the group remains prepared to manage volatility proactively—especially with parallel Middle East risk narratives elevating the geopolitical “risk premium.” The near-term implication is tighter confidence around supply discipline, which can sustain higher forward curves and complicate hedging strategies for airlines, shipping, chemicals, and heavy industry. Watch second-order effects: freight rates, petrochemical feedstock pricing, and emerging‑market FX sensitivity to oil. The policy also reinforces that energy markets remain one of the fastest transmission channels from geopolitical stress to corporate cost structures.
  opec.org
  
  
• U.S. tariff leverage reshapes India’s Russia‑energy posture — Reporting indicates Washington reduced India-facing tariff pressure after New Delhi signaled it would halt purchases of Russian oil, underscoring how trade tools are being used to enforce sanctions-aligned behavior. The strategic meaning is broader than India alone: it tests whether major “swing” importers can be pushed via market-access carrots/sticks to comply with U.S. energy and sanctions priorities. For firms, the operational implications include abrupt shifts in crude sourcing, product crack spreads, and contractual risk for refiners and commodity intermediaries, plus knock-on effects to India-linked export supply chains if tariff escalation returns. The Guardian’s framing emphasizes coercive U.S. leverage; pro-government Indian narratives often stress “sovereign energy security,” so expect domestic political sensitivity that can reintroduce policy volatility.
  theguardian.com
  
  
• EU extends suspension of tariffs on U.S. imports — Reuters reports the EU prolonged its pause on retaliatory tariffs, reducing near-term transatlantic trade volatility. This is strategically significant because it signals political appetite to contain intra-alliance economic disputes while Europe remains focused on Russia-related security and sanctions cohesion. For executives, the immediate benefit is lower probability of surprise duty costs hitting aerospace-adjacent supply chains and legacy dispute baskets; the longer-term read is that unresolved structural disputes remain “parked,” not solved—meaning tariffs can still reappear as bargaining chips if broader alliance politics deteriorate. The six‑month cadence also creates recurring decision points—useful for scenario planning and inventory timing (especially for firms with tight margin goods exposed to customs shocks).
  reuters.com

Military Developments

• U.S. dispatches a small military advisory team to Nigeria — The U.S. is sending a small contingent of military advisers to Nigeria after deadly attacks, with Washington framing the move as support requested by Abuja and aligned with broader AFRICOM priorities. For firms operating in Nigeria/West Africa—energy, mining, agribusiness, logistics—this is a meaningful signal that security assistance is tightening around intelligence, planning, and coordination rather than large-footprint deployments. It may improve tactical capacity in select zones, but it can also raise political sensitivities domestically (sovereignty narratives) and regionally (neighbor spillovers). As an official U.S. transcript, State messaging will naturally emphasize partnership and stability; independent reporting and local voices can diverge on effectiveness and civilian protection. Operationally, expect heightened scrutiny of contractor security practices and a more active U.S. role in counterterror coordination.
  apnews.com
  state.gov
  
  
• U.S. downs an Iranian drone near a carrier group — AP reports a U.S. Navy F‑35C shot down an Iranian Shahed‑type drone that approached the USS Abraham Lincoln, a reminder that “below-threshold” encounters can rapidly become kinetic. The business relevance is escalation risk management: even limited engagements can tighten insurance pricing, trigger routing adjustments, and inject volatility into oil and LNG markets. For executives, the key question is whether military posturing is being calibrated to support diplomacy (deterrence) or is drifting toward tit-for-tat cycles that increase the probability of miscalculation. The incident also highlights the drone saturation problem: low-cost systems are forcing expensive intercept decisions and raising the operational tempo for naval aviation. Companies should reassess contingency playbooks for Gulf shipping disruptions and consider how “short, sharp” incidents can cascade into weeks of logistics friction.
  apnews.com
  
  
• Satellite imagery underscores the scale of U.S. regional posture — The Washington Post describes a significant U.S. military buildup around Iran, interpreted as creating credible coercive leverage while trying to avoid immediate escalation. For geopolitical risk teams, this is a classic “deterrence vs. provocation” tradeoff: force concentration can stabilize bargaining by clarifying capability, but it also increases the number of contact points where accidents, misreads, or spoilers can ignite. For industry, the exposure concentrates in Gulf shipping, energy pricing, and sanctions compliance (especially where new measures target maritime networks). Firms with operations, suppliers, or staff across the Gulf should stress-test evacuation, communications continuity, and force majeure clauses. The most likely corporate impact is not a dramatic shutdown, but repeated bursts of market and routing volatility that raise costs and erode schedule reliability.
  washingtonpost.com
  
  
• Taiwan–U.S. collaboration advances “attritable” strike-drone capabilities — Janes reports on integration/testing work linking Taiwan’s NCSIST with U.S. firm Kratos on the Mighty Hornet IV concept, reinforcing Taipei’s push toward mass, low-cost, hard-to-intercept systems. Strategically, this supports a deterrence model built on distributing lethality and complicating PLA planning (more targets, more uncertainty). For defense-industrial executives, the signal is the accelerating shift from exquisite platforms to scalable, software-integrated, supply-chain-heavy systems—where bottlenecks (engines, datalinks, chips, composites) can be as decisive as airframes. Expect Beijing to view these steps as deepening U.S.–Taiwan military-technical integration, potentially prompting pressure in the gray zone (air/maritime activity, cyber, economic coercion). For commercial firms, the risk is secondary sanctions or informal Chinese retaliation against Taiwan-linked suppliers in strategic sectors.
  janes.com
  
  
• China conducts “combat readiness” patrols around Scarborough Shoal — SCMP reports Chinese naval and air patrol activity around the contested Scarborough Shoal, a recurring trigger point in Manila–Beijing tensions with direct alliance implications for the U.S.–Philippines treaty framework. The near-term risk is not a deliberate clash but an operational accident that becomes politically irreversible—especially amid heightened domestic nationalism on all sides. For global supply chains, the South China Sea remains a systemic artery: a localized incident can drive broader maritime risk premiums, rerouting, and congestion that affects electronics, apparel, and industrial inputs. Corporate takeaway: treat maritime security risk as an “always-on” variable in Indo-Pacific planning, not episodic news. SCMP can be perceived as reflecting a more China-attentive editorial posture than some Western outlets; cross-check with regional official statements and AIS/activity data when assessing escalation probability.
  scmp.com
  
  

Political and Diplomatic developments

• U.S.-backed Ukraine–Russia talks advance into another round — Reuters reports a “productive” opening day in U.S.-supported negotiations in Abu Dhabi, an indicator that external sponsors are still attempting to build structured diplomatic momentum despite entrenched red lines. For executives, the key is not “peace is imminent,” but that diplomatic sequencing (ceasefire modalities, territorial questions, security guarantees, sanctions relief) is being actively tested—creating real optionality for 2026 risk scenarios in energy, metals, agriculture, and European manufacturing. The immediate corporate implications cluster around sanctions compliance and investment gating: any hint of phased de-escalation can shift market expectations, but premature “peace trades” can be punished if talks stall. Firms should watch for concrete procedural markers (verification frameworks, prisoner swaps, corridor arrangements) rather than rhetoric, and track how Washington, Brussels, and Kyiv align—or diverge—on acceptable end states.
  reuters.com
  
  
• NATO leadership reaffirms Ukraine support amid political uncertainty — In a joint appearance, NATO’s Secretary General and Ukraine’s president underscored ongoing alliance backing and the strategic logic of sustained deterrence, even as debates about burden-sharing and long-term assistance intensify. For industry, this is a demand signal: Europe’s defense procurement, ammunition replenishment, and industrial scaling remain structural, not temporary—supporting multi-year pipelines in air defense, drones, ISR, and logistics. Diplomatically, NATO’s public messaging is also about cohesion: maintaining a unified front reduces Moscow’s leverage to split allies through selective diplomacy or energy pressure. As a NATO transcript, the framing is alliance-forward by design; private European politics (budgets, elections, coalition constraints) can still narrow what capitals can actually deliver. Executives should read this as continuity in intent, with variability in capacity and timelines.
  nato.int
  
  
• Gulf money meets Sudan war diplomacy as donor efforts intensify — Reuters reports the UAE pledged major funding into a UN humanitarian mechanism for Sudan as Washington convened donors and pushed for a truce timeline. The geopolitical relevance is two-layered: (1) humanitarian diplomacy is being used as a pathway to ceasefire leverage; and (2) persistent allegations about external backing for Sudanese armed actors remain a reputational and policy risk for Gulf states and their commercial partners. For firms, Sudan is a high-volatility environment affecting regional logistics, gold flows, and cross-border security in the Red Sea–Sahel corridor. Corporate exposure is often indirect (partners, ports, subcontractors, or compliance in adjacent jurisdictions). The practical watchpoint is whether donor coordination translates into monitoring/enforcement mechanisms—or remains funding without political traction.
  reuters.com
  
  
• UN messaging hardens around permanence of ceasefire and end-state politics — A UN statement emphasizes that a ceasefire must be permanent and “occupation must end,” reflecting continued institutional pressure to connect immediate humanitarian stabilization with longer-horizon political resolution. For executives, the relevance is that UN framing increasingly shapes downstream policy: sanctions debates, human-rights due diligence expectations, supply-chain screening, and litigation risk in certain jurisdictions. Even when Security Council dynamics limit binding action, UN discourse influences NGOs, investors, and public procurement standards. The near-term implication is heightened reputational and compliance sensitivity for companies operating in or trading with contested territories—especially where end-use, dual-use items, and security services intersect. As always with UN venues, member-state politics can create rhetorical maximalism that outpaces feasible diplomacy; firms should track which narratives are converting into national regulations, not only statements.
  press.un.org
  
  
• India signals deeper ASEAN engagement via Malaysia visit planning — India’s foreign ministry briefing on the prime minister’s Malaysia trip highlights New Delhi’s continued prioritization of Southeast Asia as both an economic node and a strategic arena (connectivity, maritime security, supply-chain diversification). For industry executives, the significance is practical: India is using bilateral and ASEAN-focused diplomacy to reduce single-point dependencies, strengthen manufacturing and energy corridors, and expand “trusted” trade and technology ties. Malaysia’s role as a logistics and semiconductor-adjacent hub makes the relationship commercially relevant beyond symbolic diplomacy. Official briefings naturally emphasize positive-sum outcomes; the risk lens is that regional states remain sensitive to being pulled into major-power blocs. Companies should view India–ASEAN diplomacy as enabling infrastructure and regulatory pathways—but with periodic volatility driven by domestic politics, South China Sea pressures, and U.S.–China competition.
  mea.gov.in

Geostrategic Flashpoints

• China pushes back on Panama Canal-linked influence narratives — A Newsweek report highlights Beijing’s sharp response to Panama-related developments, underscoring how infrastructure chokepoints (like canal-adjacent ports and logistics concessions) are now treated as strategic terrain in U.S.–China rivalry. The canal’s centrality to global shipping means even politically symbolic moves can have outsized market signaling effects—insurers, shipping alliances, and commodity traders watch for any hint of operational politicization. For executives, the key risk is second-order: regulatory scrutiny on Chinese-linked operators, investment screening, and potential retaliatory measures that affect Latin American supply chains. Newsweek can lean toward a more confrontational U.S. framing; Chinese official narratives often depict such coverage as “containment” propaganda. A balanced takeaway is that Panama is becoming a test case for how smaller states navigate great-power competition without destabilizing critical trade infrastructure.
  newsweek.com
  
  
• Geography as destiny: a strategic reminder for planners — A Bloomberg opinion piece argues that the U.S., China, and Russia remain constrained (and empowered) by geography in ways that technology and alliances cannot fully erase. For industry strategy, the value is not the specific thesis but the planning posture it supports: supply chains, data routes, and energy systems are still anchored to physical corridors—straits, rail hubs, undersea cables, and border-adjacent industrial clusters—where geopolitics bites hardest. The argument implicitly challenges “frictionless globalization” assumptions and supports more regionalized operating models (nearshoring, dual sourcing, and corridor diversification). As an opinion product, Bloomberg’s framing reflects a macro-geostrategic lens that may underplay agency—policy choices and shocks still matter. Still, for executives, the practical use is scenario discipline: map revenue and critical inputs against geography-driven risk concentration.
  bloomberg.com
  
  
• WSJ opinion: “Putin isn’t winning” and leverage still exists — A Wall Street Journal opinion column, citing a CSIS assessment, argues Russia has not achieved a decisive outcome in Ukraine and that the U.S. retains military and economic tools to shape the trajectory. The strategic relevance is the policy signal: influential U.S. commentary ecosystems are still debating “pressure vs. compromise,” and these narratives can translate into real-world decisions on aid flows, sanctions scope, and negotiation posture. Because this is an opinion piece, it carries editorial bias—often favoring a hardline deterrence posture—and other analysts contest what “winning” means (territory, attrition, political objectives, or Western unity). For business leaders, the actionable point is that U.S. policy could swing between escalation of pressure and phased de-risking, and either path affects sanctions, energy markets, and European investment conditions.
  wsj.com
  
  
• NATO begins planning for an Arctic mission amid Greenland-related tensions — Reuters reports NATO has started military planning for an “Arctic Sentry” mission, reflecting both external competition (Russia/China interest in the High North) and intra-alliance political strain linked to Greenland. For corporates, the Arctic is no longer a niche theater: it intersects with critical minerals, satellite coverage, undersea cable routes, fisheries, and future shipping optionality—even if commercial transit remains seasonal and risk-heavy. Increased NATO planning suggests more surveillance, presence, and potential rules-setting, which can improve predictability for lawful commerce but also raises the risk of militarized signaling and counter-moves. The Greenland angle matters: alliance cohesion is itself a strategic variable, and commercial decisions (ports, airports, mining licenses) can become politicized faster than many firms anticipate.
  reuters.com
  
  
• Venezuela remains a live hemisphere flashpoint with direct U.S. involvement — CFR’s updated conflict tracker frames Venezuela as an active U.S. confrontation case, highlighting how domestic instability there can internationalize rapidly and produce sanctions volatility, migration pressure, and regional diplomatic polarization. For executives, Venezuela risk isn’t confined to upstream energy or metals; it extends to financial compliance, shipping, and exposure via Latin American supply chains and remittances. The tracker format is analytical rather than “breaking news,” but it is useful because it consolidates the operational risk picture—policy posture, escalation pathways, and stability indicators—in one place. CFR’s institutional perspective tends to align with U.S. foreign-policy mainstream assumptions; firms should supplement with regional political intelligence to gauge how neighboring states respond (support, hedging, or pushback) and how quickly Washington’s tactics might change with domestic politics.
  cfr.org

Terrorism and Conflict

• Mass-casualty attack hits a Shiite mosque near Islamabad — AP reports a deadly bombing at a Shiite mosque outside Pakistan’s capital, underscoring Pakistan’s persistent sectarian-terrorism risk and the continuing operational space for transnational militant branding (with competing attribution narratives circulating). The strategic impact is twofold: internal security strain on the state, and renewed cross-border accusation dynamics (notably claims about militant sanctuaries and outside involvement) that can harden regional postures. For industry, Pakistan risk manifests through workforce security, political disruption, and volatility in corridors linking South/Central Asia—especially where infrastructure and energy projects are concentrated. Longer term, watch whether the state responds with intensified operations that create localized disruptions—or whether political fragmentation limits sustained counterterror effectiveness.
  apnews.com
  
  
• Pakistan claims major militant losses as Balochistan fighting subsides — Reuters reports the military declared the end of a week-long fight in Balochistan with large militant casualty claims, while insurgent narratives dispute finality—highlighting the chronic “information fog” around counterinsurgency outcomes. Strategically, this matters because Balochistan sits on high-value infrastructure routes (including energy and port-linked projects), and persistent insecurity undermines Pakistan’s ability to guarantee corridor reliability. For executives, the risk is not only physical security but contractual uncertainty: project timelines, insurance, and force majeure triggers become recurring features, not exceptional events. The broader pattern also increases the probability of “urbanization” of insurgency—attacks migrating toward transport nodes and commercial centers—raising systemic business disruption risk. Treat government casualty numbers as directional rather than definitive; the operational reality is whether access, movement, and state control improve measurably in affected districts.
  reuters.com
  
  
• U.S. strikes ISIS targets in Syria, signaling enduring counterterror priority — Stars and Stripes reports new U.S. strikes against ISIS-linked targets in Syria, reinforcing that the “post‑caliphate” phase remains kinetic and that threat resurgence is treated as strategically unacceptable by Washington. For geopolitics professionals, this points to continued U.S. military engagement even amid competing priorities (Iran, great-power competition), and to the fragility of governance and security vacuums that allow ISIS remnants to persist. For business, Syria’s direct commercial exposure is limited for many firms, but the indirect effects are not: instability affects regional trade routes, refugee flows, and the security calculus of neighboring markets (Iraq, Turkey, Jordan). The strikes also highlight escalation coupling—U.S. operations can become entangled with other actors’ agendas in Syria’s crowded battlespace, raising the risk of unintended incidents with state or proxy forces.
  stripes.com
  
  
• Rafah crossing reopening offers limited relief—but sustainability remains uncertain — Chatham House’s expert comment argues that Rafah’s reopening is meaningful for Palestinian mobility and medical evacuation but structurally fragile, dependent on political tradeoffs that can collapse under domestic Israeli politics and security incidents. For executives, the relevance is that “ceasefire progress” does not equal de-risking: fragile arrangements can still generate episodic disruptions in regional transport, public sentiment, and regulatory posture (e.g., sanctions proposals, procurement restrictions, or heightened compliance scrutiny on dual-use exports). The crossing is also a barometer of broader diplomatic bandwidth—if Rafah access improves, it can signal temporary stabilizing momentum; if it stalls, it often precedes renewed confrontation. This is an analytical source rather than a straight newswire, but it provides a useful framework: treat humanitarian openings as tactical, and plan for rapid reversals that can affect the Eastern Mediterranean–Red Sea security environment.
  chathamhouse.org
  
  
• South Sudan: airstrike hits MSF hospital amid widening operations — AP reports a Doctors Without Borders facility in South Sudan was struck by a government airstrike, highlighting a deteriorating protection environment for humanitarian assets and civilians. Strategically, this indicates a conflict trajectory where aerial capability becomes a coercive tool and where “humanitarian deconfliction” mechanisms are failing—or being disregarded—raising the risk of broader international pressure, aid suspensions, and sanctions debates. For industry, South Sudan’s instability has outsized significance because of its oil-linked economy and the role of cross-border logistics. Beyond immediate security, the reputational risk is acute: companies operating nearby can be drawn into allegations about enabling conflict dynamics, especially through transport, fuel, or payments ecosystems. For risk teams, this is a reminder to integrate humanitarian-access and civilian-harm indicators into country exposure models, not only front-line battle reporting.
  apnews.com
  
  

WMD&CyberWarfare

• New START expiry leaves major arsenals unconstrained — Defense News reports on the lapse of New START limits and renewed calls for a replacement framework, raising the prospect of an arms-control vacuum between the two largest nuclear arsenals. For executives, the near-term business impact is indirect but important: heightened strategic instability tends to increase defense spending, accelerate space and missile-defense investment, and elevate geopolitical risk premia that affect capital markets and insurance. It can also raise regulatory sensitivity around dual-use exports (advanced materials, computing, sensing) as governments tighten controls under a “new nuclear age” narrative. The political challenge is that successor agreements require verification, ceilings, and domestic buy-in—harder under high mistrust and active conflict environments. While markets may not price this immediately, long-cycle industries (aerospace, semiconductors, energy infrastructure) should treat the loss of guardrails as a structural risk factor, not a headline event.
  defensenews.com
  
  
• U.S.–Iran nuclear talks in Oman restart with cautious momentum — The Guardian reports Iran described the Oman-mediated talks as a “good start,” with both sides agreeing to continue engagement amid deep distrust and a high-risk regional military backdrop. The strategic significance is that diplomacy is being attempted under maximal pressure conditions—sanctions, military posturing, and domestic political constraints—which can either force compromise or break talks quickly. For industry, the key variables are sanctions trajectory and energy/shipping risk: even modest progress can reduce tail-risk pricing in crude and freight, while failure can revive escalation scenarios across the Gulf. As a UK outlet, the Guardian can emphasize humanitarian and anti-escalation framing; U.S. and Iranian official narratives will differ on red lines (enrichment, inspections, missiles, proxies). Executives should watch for concrete process markers—follow-on meeting dates, agenda scope, and verification concepts—rather than optimistic headlines.
  theguardian.com
  
  
• FTC escalates U.S. policy attention on ransomware — The FTC issued a report to Congress outlining its work against ransomware and related cyber threats, signaling that consumer protection and data-security enforcement remain central to Washington’s cyber posture. For executives, this is a “regulatory demand” indicator: beyond breach response, authorities are increasingly focused on prevention, vendor oversight, and deceptive-practices theories tied to cybersecurity claims. Practical implication: audit your incident readiness, third‑party risk controls, and the defensibility of public security statements (marketing, investor disclosures, procurement certifications). The FTC lens also means cross-border coordination may increase—especially where ransomware groups operate transnationally and where payment flows intersect with sanctions regimes. While the report itself doesn’t change law overnight, it foreshadows sustained scrutiny of how companies manage sensitive data, notify victims, and secure critical business services—particularly in sectors that touch government customers or essential infrastructure.
  ftc.gov
  
  
• CISA-driven patch urgency highlights supply-chain cyber persistence — The Record reports on federal patch directives tied to an exploited SolarWinds-related vulnerability (and notes timing on broader cyber reporting rules), reinforcing that “software supply chain” remains a top-tier systemic risk. For industry leaders, the operational takeaway is simple: patch velocity is now a board-level resilience metric, especially where exploited bugs hit widely used enterprise tooling. The strategic dimension is also escalating: persistent exploitation blurs boundaries between criminal operations and state-aligned activity, and government response increasingly uses mandates and deadlines—not just guidance. Firms should pressure-test asset inventories, privileged access hygiene, and vendor contract clauses around vulnerability disclosure and remediation timelines. Even if you are not a federal contractor, the same exploit chains routinely propagate into commercial environments via shared IT stacks, MSPs, and third‑party integrations—meaning federal alerts often function as early warning for broader private-sector exposure.
  Therecord.media
  
  
• Conduent ransomware breach scope expands, underscoring govtech fragility — TechCrunch reports the ransomware incident at Conduent widened, with stolen datasets containing significant personal information tied to government and corporate end-users. The geopolitical relevance is that attacks on “boring” backbone vendors can become national resilience issues: payment systems, benefits administration, transit and municipal services often depend on such intermediaries. For executives, the key lesson is concentration risk—critical workflows may hinge on a small number of service providers whose compromise becomes your crisis. This increases the value of (1) contractual visibility into subcontractors; (2) segmentation and data-minimization; (3) tested manual/alternate process continuity; and (4) clear coordination channels with public-sector clients and regulators. Expect the incident to reinforce policy momentum toward mandatory cyber reporting, tighter procurement security requirements, and tougher liability debates for vendors serving critical services.
  techcrunch.com