The Arctic’s Emerging Geopolitics: Recommendations for the U.S. and its NATO Allies

by Bert Chapman (Purdue University)

ABSTRACT

The Arctic region possesses significant oil and natural gas resources and is becoming an increasingly important arena of geopolitical contention.  Canada, China, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States are acutely interested in gaining and maintaining access to its waters and natural resources.  Warming temperatures are increasing the ability of these and other countries to access this region during the year.  This article examines recent policy documents and actions, which are inherently political, taken by these and other countries and offers recommendations for the U.S. and its allies to ensure that access to this region is not threatened by China or Russia.

GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF RIVAL CLAIMS TO THE ARCTIC

Domestic and international attention remains fixated on security challenges confronting the U.S. involving China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.  While these are important areas of vital strategic concern to the U.S., another area of growing geopolitical concern to U.S. foreign and national security policymakers and the general public is the Arctic Ocean region.  U.S. law defines the Arctic as encompassing “all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain”.¹

International legal definitions of the Arctic region vary focusing on concepts such as tree growth, the Arctic Circle, and the spatial territory north of 66 degrees 30 minutes latitude.  The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 76, furthers this confusion by noting the following salient definitional features:  the continental nautical shelf coverage of 200 nautical miles, the emergence of new trade routes due to warming temperatures and melting ice drastically shortening potential sea routes from Asia to Europe as the following map demonstrates, the presence of significant natural resources such as oil and gas attracting the interest of countries as varied as Norway, the United States, Russia, Canada, and Denmark, numerous environmental concerns, and concerns of indigenous residents of these regions who are now being confronted with the geopolitical aspirations of multiple countries.²

FIGURE 1: Arctic Region Map (Source: Central Intelligence Agency)³

FIGURE 2: Potential Shipping Lanes Through the Arctic Ocean (Source:  Army University Press)⁴ (See p. 116.)

One factor prompting the increasing international importance of the Arctic Ocean is its rich availability of energy resources which are becoming increasingly accessible due to warming temperatures and advances in natural resources extraction technology.  A 2008 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimate maintained that the Arctic contained 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids with 84% of these occurring in offshore areas.  This analysis estimated that over 70% of offshore oil resources occur in the Arctic Alaska, Amerasian Basin, East Greenland Rift Basins, East Barents Basins, and West-Greenland Canada.  More than 70% of undiscovered natural gas is estimated to occur in the West Siberian Basin, the East Barents Basin, and Arctic Alaska.⁵

The following year another USGS assessment of petroleum and natural gas resources for the Barents Sea off the coasts of Norway and Russia estimated it possessed over 76 billion barrels of oil equivalent including approximately 11 billion barrels of crude oil, 380 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 2 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.⁶

Numerous countries are involved in Arctic political issues including countries bordering on the Arctic Sea such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States.  Other countries involved in Arctic policymaking include China, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Several governmental and nongovernmental international organizations are involved in international Arctic policymaking including the Arctic Council and national governments of many countries have diplomatic, military, and scientific organizations pursuing national Arctic policy objectives and strategic interests.  

There are some international agreements concerning the Arctic including the 1920 Svalbard Treaty which came into effect in 1925, and the 2008 Illulisat Declaration involving the U.S., Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark promising to protect the marine environment, maritime safety, divide emergency responsibilities if new shipping routes are opened, blocking a comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean, and promising to settle overlapping mapping claims and territorial disputes.⁷   The multilateral Svalbard Treaty of 1920 covering the Svalbard Islands giving Norway sovereignty over this territory but allowing other signatory parties non-discriminatory access to its natural resources,⁸ and a 2010 Norwegian-Russian Treaty aspiring to divide the Barents Sea and part of the Arctic Ocean into clear economic zones reaching Europe’s northern continental shelf potentially opening the way for oil and natural gas exploration in this region.⁹

COMPETING NATIONAL CLAIMS AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

Despite the prevalence of idealistic rhetoric about keeping the Arctic a conflict-free region, ongoing international economic, environmental, military, and political trends are moving the Arctic Region towards increased international political contentiousness, if not potential conflict, due to overlapping boundary claims and innate national territorial assertiveness as partially demonstrated by the following map.

FIGURE 3:  Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries in the Arctic (Source:  Durham University International Boundary Research Unit)¹⁰

Such divergent perspectives are reflected in recent national military and foreign policy documents produced by adjacent countries and partially reflected in their policymaking actions. These documents and developments will now be covered.

ARCTIC CLAIMS BY NON-CONTIGUOUS POWERS

China: Maritime Power and the Arctic Ocean

Although not geographically contiguous to the Arctic Ocean, Chinese’s increasing economic influence and military power make the Arctic an area of interest to Beijing though its geopolitical interests in the Arctic are not as significant as its lofty aspirations toward the East and South China Seas.   While China signed the Svalbard Treaty in 1925 recognizing Norwegian sovereignty over these islands, contemporary Chinese policymakers refer to China as a “near-Arctic state”, describe Arctic natural resources as being the “common heritage of mankind,” and joined the Arctic Council in 2013 as an observer state.   While some Chinese Arctic analysts urge China to take a more passive or coastal role toward the Arctic, others believe Beijing should become more Source:  assertive or blue water in its Arctic posture.¹¹

This latter group sees the Arctic as an alternative to the Malacca Strait which they contend the U.S. and its allies could use to choke off access to Persian Gulf oil, that the Arctic is at a crossroads between the European Union, Eurasia, and the U.S. with Washington’s ballistic missile defense capability at Fort Greely, AK potentially being directed at China; that Arctic access would enable China to break free from Western pressure and emerge on the world stage; and that the Arctic could be used to expand China’s energy and transportation infrastructures by connecting to the One Belt One Road Project.  Additional advocacy of China taking a more military oriented Arctic role is provided by People’s Liberation Army Naval War College staffer Yang Zhirong who argues that melting ice reduces the distance between regional great powers while increasing the Arctic’s strategic importance, urges China to add a military component to its Arctic strategy like Russia and the U.S., dedicating naval staff to Arctic affairs, improving regional communication, and making ports of call visits to Arctic ports.¹²

China’s 2015 National Military Strategy does not mention the Arctic as an area of explicit strategic interest.  However, it references safeguarding Chinese security interests in new domains and safeguarding Chinese interests overseas so it would not be surprising if future Chinese military strategy documents include the Arctic and provide detailed guidance on how it would use military force to defend its Arctic strategic interests.  An October 17, 2015 speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming described China as a near-Arctic state.¹³

China published its Arctic Policy paper on January 26, 2018.  Highlights of this document included stressing that while states outside the Arctic region did not have territorial sovereignty, they have rights concerning scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, and rights to natural resource exploration and extraction consistent with UNCLOS and general international law.  This document noted that China built a research station in the Spitsbergen Archipelago in 2004, that it would continue its efforts to protect the Arctic, that it aspires to build a Polar Silk Road by developing Arctic shipping routes, and that it will participate actively in Arctic governance.

China and Russia established a Sino-Arctic Research Center in April 2019.  Beijing and Moscow plan to use this center to conduct a joint Arctic expedition to research optimal Northern Sea Routes and the impact of climate change with China incurring 75% of expedition expenses. In May 2019, China hosted the Arctic Circle China Forum in Shanghai while highlighting its partnership with countries along the Polar Silk Road.  Beijing also maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates two ice-breaking vessels.  2019 also saw China launch the Xue Long 2 as its second icebreaking vessel which can break ice 1.5 meters thick and is the first polar research vessel capable of breaking ice moving forwards or backwards.  The U.S. Defense Department also believes Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) may be in the embryonic stages of developing Beijing’s first nuclear-powered icebreaker though the potential completion date of this vessel is uncertain.¹⁴

At the same time, China’s assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas should produce skepticism that it will maintain such passivity toward Arctic affairs and that it will observe Svalbard Treaty commitments if it feels it will not confront significant opposition from the U.S. and other western powers interested in Arctic strategic stability.¹⁵

Finland:  The Arctic and National Insecurity

Finland does not border directly on the Arctic but is an Arctic country that is acutely aware of how Arctic impacts its security and how Russian behavior also impacts Helsinki’s national interests.  The Finnish Government’s 2013 Arctic Strategy called for peaceful cooperation in the Arctic with its neighbors and stressed the importance of preserving the Arctic’s unique physical environment.  This document also stressed the extensive experience Finnish military personnel have working in the Arctic environment and their interoperability with other international partners due to cold climate training and exercises.  It noted that Arctic Ocean coastal states had upgraded their maritime surveillance, military capabilities, and frequency of military exercises while also taking the delusional stance that military conflict in the Arctic is improbable.¹⁶

A more realistic assessment of Arctic and Baltic security conditions began appearing in Finland’s 2017 defense white paper.  This document noted increasing military activity and tensions in the Baltic Sea with early-warning period for crises becoming shorter and the threshold for using force has been lowered with Russian strategic weapons being based in the Kola Peninsula a major contributing factor in this increased tension.  This caused Finnish policymakers to develop plans to increase Helsinki’s land, maritime, cyber, and air defense capabilities along with their cooperation with Sweden and the U.S.  Specific policy responses to this more threatening security environment include increasing the wartime strength of Finnish military personnel from 230,000-280,000, spending $1.485 billion on naval vessel enhancements, and increasing annual defense spending by $68 million from 2018-2020 and $185.641 million annually beginning in 2021.¹⁷

Sweden:  Doubting the Efficacy of Collective Security

Sweden, like Finland, is not geographically located on the Arctic Ocean, but is considered an Arctic country possessing significant interests in regional strategic matters.  Sweden’s 2011 Arctic strategy document maintained that security policy tensions were low and that the Arctic Council should be the central multilateral forum for addressing Arctic issues.  It acknowledged Russia placing considerable importance on the Arctic for security policy and economic reasons, stressed historic Swedish activities in the Arctic including ongoing scientific research on Svalbard, and acknowledging that climate change may make security matters more salient in Arctic policy discussions.¹⁸

Increasing Russian assertiveness in Crimea, Ukraine, the Baltic, and Arctic would soon produce changes in Swedish Arctic policy pronouncements.  A June 1, 2015 statement of Swedish defense policy noted national security policymaking must now focus on regional issues and planning for wartime scenarios emphasizing protecting air and sea lanes to Sweden and the Baltic region.  

Stockholm’s defense budget was expected to increase by $887 million between 2016-2020 and this expenditure would eventually increase cumulatively by $28 billion.  Deliverables from this increased spending would be applied to main battle tanks and infantry combat vehicles, naval corvettes, air defense and anti-submarine capabilities, and increases in the number of Grippen jet fighters from 60 to 70 with the final delivery occurring in the mid-2020s.  In September 2017 Sweden announced that its 2018 defense spending would increase by $338 million.¹⁹

MINOR CONTIGUOUS POWERS

Norway: Responding to Russian Assertiveness

Norway has become increasingly assertive in defending its interests in the Arctic in recent years.  Oslo has become more concerned about Russian assertiveness and has taken defense steps to attempt to counter Moscow’s behavior while also seeking to cooperate with Moscow on Svalbard Island and environmental matters.  In December 2006, Norway’s Foreign Ministry issued its High North Strategy.  This document began saying “the Government states that it considers the High North to be Norway’s most important strategic priority in the years ahead … we stake out the course for our High North policy, seeking to improve coordination and to maximize the effect of our efforts.”²⁰

This document went on to stress the importance of close cooperation between Norway’s Armed Forces, Coast Guard, legal prosecution authorities, and law enforcement on resource management, conflict prevention, and maintaining predictability and stability.  It vowed to increase cooperation with Russia and continue Oslo’s efforts to ensure nuclear safety and emergency preparedness in the High North along with possibly supporting efforts to initiate trade along the Northern East-West Freight Corridor to provide a transport solution from Central Asia to North America through the port of Narvik.²¹

FIGURE 4:  Scandinavia from the Arctic (Source:  Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs)²² (See p. 12.)

While the 2010 Barents Sea delimitation agreement between Norway and Russia seemed to herald greater bilateral comity, Russia’s 2014 actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have prompted a gradual change in Norwegian attitudes toward Moscow. An April 21, 2017 foreign and security policy white paper from the Norwegian Government to the Storting (Parliament) noted that these Russian actions had changed the European security landscape and that Russia was strengthening its northern military capabilities and presence which had significant implications for Norway.  These changes require Norway to strengthen its northern defense capabilities and allow an expanded allied presence and more frequent military exercises in the North.²³

This document went on to note that with the U.S. contributing over 70% of NATO’s defense spending, that Norway and other NATO allies cannot assume the U.S. will maintain its current level of European military interest and engagement, that the U.S, EU, Russia, and China are increasingly promoting their Arctic interests, which impinge on Norway’s interests in the region.  Russia’s geographic location makes it a key Arctic player and that Moscow’s goals include securing access to energy resources, using the Northeast Passage as a transport corridor, and maintaining Russian control and influence in the Arctic. Russian nuclear deterrence and retaliation capabilities, based in the Kola Peninsula, have been significantly upgraded since 2008, and should a security crisis develop Russia could move its forces to reduce Norway’s freedom of action and movement on its own territory, limit Allied access to the North Sea and North Atlantic, and make it difficult for NATO to supply and reinforce Norway’s defense and that of adjacent allies.²⁴

Norway’s response to this has involved suspending military cooperation with Russia, but maintaining communication with Russia to reduce the possibility of misunderstandings and dangerous incidents by being transparent in its military activities, maintaining long-standing cooperation with allied forces in military exercises on Norwegian territory, purchasing up to 52 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for $8.895 billion with the first ones arriving in November 2017, extending military conscription to women in 2015, increasing defense spending by 2.6% between 2015-2016, reiterating NATO’s importance in its June 2016 long-term defense plan, and establishing a new Ranger Company to be focused on the northern border with Russia.²⁵

Iceland: Military Weakness and Collective Responsibility

Although an Arctic country and a member of NATO, Iceland does not have the economic or military clout or population to be a significant player in Arctic strategic policymaking.  An October 18, 2015 address by Iceland’s Prime Minister to the Arctic Circle Assembly delineated Reykjavik’s Arctic policy stressing climate change, how the eight Arctic states “share a common responsibility and mutual interest in the protection and sustainability of the Arctic,” that international competition and military conflict over the Arctic should be avoided, and that promoting education about the Arctic and its indigenous populations should be a high international priority.²⁶

Denmark: The Hans Island Dispute

Danish interests in Arctic geopolitics primarily derive from its possession of Greenland, being an integral member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance and being a Nordic nation with trading and scientific interests in this region.  Copenhagen has traditionally sought to minimize the prospect of conflict in the Arctic and to maintain amicable relations with Russia.  Greenland is home of the Thule Airbase which plays an important role in U.S. ballistic missile defense and Denmark and Canada have disputed over who owns uninhabited Hans Island in the 22 mile wide Nares Strait between Greenland and Canada due to a dispute over the 12 mile territorial limit of either shore which both countries are allowed to claim under international law.²⁷

FIGURE 5: Hans Island and Thule Air Base (Source: Canadian Military Journal)²⁸ (See p. 25.)

Concern over increasing Russian assertiveness in the Baltic Region and the Arctic is causing Denmark to take a more assertive defense posture.  The Danes are proposing to increase defense spending by 20% or $798 million between 2018-2023.  These increases will go toward augmenting ground-based air defense, enhancing Royal Danish Navy frigate capabilities with short and long-range missiles to counter hostile aircraft and missiles, equipping naval frigates with sonar and anti-torpedo systems and marine helicopters with dipping sonars to engage in anti-submarine warfare, increase the number of conscripts by approximately 500 per year, expanding the Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s analytic capability, and purchasing 27 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for $3.325 billion to enhance potential military operations in the Arctic and Baltic through 2026.²⁹

Canada: Free Riding and Arctic Security

Canadian policy toward the Arctic has been marked by an often sanctimonious rhetorical desire to declare its northern waters as being sovereign national territory and seeking to restrict international access to those waters without backing up this rhetoric with credible military force.  Ottawa’s geographic proximity to the U.S. and its close interrelationship with U.S. military defense policymaking structures such as NORAD make it easier for it to engage in such rhetorical grandstanding.³⁰

FIGURE 6:  Northwest Passage (Source:  Central Intelligence Agency)³¹

This repeated failure by Canadian Governments representing Conservative and Liberal Parties to militarily buttress their Arctic claims has been demonstrated in inconstant defense spending to provide air, maritime, and ground forces to reinforce Canadian claims in this region despite repeated rhetoric to the contrary.  A 2013 Canadian Army document claimed Ottawa would increase Arctic capabilities by preparing, training, and equipping forces for a broad range of missions.   The Canadian Government’s 2017 Defense White Paper maintains Canada will increase its long-term presence in the Arctic and work cooperatively with Arctic partners, acquire next-generation satellites to enhance its regional surveillance, and provide the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) with five or six ice-capable ships to enforce its sovereignty claims.  A 2017 RCN strategic planning document stresses Canadian maritime forces must become better equipped for Arctic operations, emphasizes that Canada has the world’s lengthiest coastline, asserts that climate change will make the High North a commercially viable sea route between Europe and Asia for the first time with the Northwest Passage and Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) benefitting, and that successful military use of the Arctic requires a forward deployed strategy.  Increasing Ottawa’s submarine, combatant ships, maritime helicopters and patrol aircraft, and support ships are long-term goals for increasing Canada’s Arctic defense capabilities out to 2050.  Canada has also conducted annual military exercises Operation Nanook in the Arctic since 2007 with these consisting of a maximum of several hundred personnel.³²

United Kingdom: Historic Maritime Power Expressing Interest

The United Kingdom has been one of the world’s premier maritime powers and as a NATO member plays a critically important role in the alliance’s military policymaking.  A British parliamentary committee began conducting an investigation on Arctic security in late December 2016 and issued a report on August 15, 2018 detailing steps it believes Whitehall should take to advance British interests in that region.  These included recognizing the need for a comprehensive strategy for meeting Russian power projection from the High North into the Atlantic, the need to appoint an Arctic Ambassador to coordinate Whitehall Arctic policy and enhance UK representation in Arctic affairs, being wary of Russian Arctic intentions given Moscow’s revisionist attitude to international rules, the need for increasing London’s anti-submarine warfare capability, and the need for the Ministry of Defence to explain its policies on aircraft carriers operating in the Arctic and High North.  The governmental response to this committee report on October 17, 2018 broadly affirmed committee recommendations.  It remains to be seen what financial resources and naval investments it will recommend to fulfill national interests which are likely to be closely tied to NATO Arctic policymaking objectives.³³

A positive action in this regard is September 2020 Royal Navy leadership of a multinational task force including Denmark, Norway, and the United States into the Barents Sea to demonstrate international freedom of navigation above the Arctic Circle for the first time in over twenty years.  British ships participating in this exercise included the frigate HMS Sutherland and RFA Tidespring. The Royal Air Force was represented by Typhoon fighters and a Voyager refueling aircraft.  HMS Sutherland lead these ships and aircraft through exercises testing their ability to conduct submarine and anti-submarine warfare, sea replenishment, and exercises to improve NATO interoperability in this challenging environment.³⁴

MAJOR CONTIGUOUS POWERS

Russian Arctic Claims and Potential Conflict

The primary source of increasing Arctic international geopolitical and strategic contentiousness is Russia.   In 2001 Russia submitted a formal claim to the United Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for an area of 460,000 square miles running from the undersea Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge to the North Pole roughly equaling the combined territory of Germany, France, and Italy.  This claim was rejected by the UN, but Mosco