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ARTICLE



How leaders exercise emergent strategy? Lessons from Moshe Dayan

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ABSTRACT

This paper to uncover how leaders practice emergent strategy as a core strategic philosophy. The article uses the case of general and statesman Moshe Dayan as a principal case study to uncover leadership and management practices of emergent strategy. Following a discussion on the emergent versus deliberate strategy schools, I show why Moshe Dayan as a leader can be considered as an archetype of the emergent approach worth studying. I then present six leadership principles that enabled him to practice the emergent approach. The article concludes with discussion of the limitations and value of the emergent approach for leaders today.

KEYWORDS Moshe Dayan; emergent strategy; Israel; strategy formulation; leadership

Introduction

The aim of this article is to uncover how leaders practice emergent strategy as a core strategic philosophy. The article uses the case of general and statesman Moshe Dayan, one of the most influential figures in the history of the state of Israel, as a principal case study to uncover leadership and management practices of emergent strategy.

Moshe Dayan, the sixth chief of staff (COS) of the Israel Defense Forces (from December 1953 to January 1958), is primarily known for having been the COS who took command of an army with low morale and little motivation and imbued it with a fighting spirit, audacity, and initiative. Much has been written about how Dayan spearheaded a revolution affecting every aspect of IDF leadership. Years later as defense minister during the Six-Day War, his leadership inspired confidence in the ranks of the military and the nation as a whole. He was undoubtedly one of the most influential, colorful, and creative figures in Israeli history who garnered some glorious achievements but also a few resounding failures, most notably the surprise in the Yom Kippur War.

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The article is structured the following way: After presenting the two principal approaches to strategic planning – deliberate versus emergent, I establish why Moshe Dayan's leadership is an archetypical example of a leader who adheres to the emergent strategy approach. I then explore Dayan's leadership principles from his term as COS (1953–1958), defense minister (1967 to 1974) and foreign minister (1977 to 1979). These have been divided into six principles that serve to support his approach to strategy as an emergent phenomena: contextualized learning process; deciding and promoting priorities according to the 'Pareto principle'; empower your team and delegate; time management for maximum unpredictability; use meetings to generate new ideas and turn them to action and always be close to the action. Lastly, I conclude with a few comments on why Dayan's leadership principles are relevant for leaders today.

Deliberate strategy versus emergent strategy

Strategy is generally understood as 'The direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired results'.¹ Although the term 'strategy' is now used in diverse senses, it developed in the context of war-making and the connection between war-making as a means for political ends. Colin Gray likened strategy to a 'bridge' between policy objectives and the act of war.²

The theory of strategy formulation offers two distinct models for strategic planning and execution. The first, Deliberate Strategy, refers to strategic action in a hierarchical and highly centralized format: decisions are taken by the head of the organization, detailed plans are made, and instructions are issued to the echelons responsible for implementation. This model is characterized by centralized and detailed planning and control. In recent years organizations are coping with an uncertain and unstable environment,³ as a result they are in 'a continuous state of flow'⁴ for which the deliberate models fail to provide an adequate response. The alternative model that is better suited to cope with this situation is referred to in the literature as Emergent Strategy.⁵ A major characteristic of the Emergent approach is flexibility on *ends* and not a merely tactical flexibility at the level of *means*.⁶

¹Colin Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (NY: Oxford UP, 2010), 18.

²*Ibid.*, 29.

³The American military came up with the initials VUCA – Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous. Nick Horney, Bill Pasmore and Tom O'Shea 'Leadership Agility: A Business Imperative for a VUCA World,' *People and Strategy*, 2010, 32–38.

⁴Tor Hernes, *A Process Theory of Organization* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1.

⁵Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, 'Of strategies, deliberate and emergent,' *Strategic Management Journal*, July 1985, pp.257–272, Henry Mintzberg, 'The fall and rise of strategic planning,' *Harvard Business Review*, 1994, 107. And in the context of international relations: Ionut C. Popescu, 'Grand Strategy vs. Emergent Strategy in the conduct of foreign policy' *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41/3 (2018), 438–460.

⁶Popescu, 'Grand Strategy vs. Emergent Strategy', 447.

Deliberate Strategy entails a process of planning that is created at the apex of the organizational pyramid to achieve a complete, whole output. When the planned output is finalized, there is an effort to force the plan onto reality. By contrast, Emergent Strategy is more open, the outcome is never final, and the approach assumes ahead of time that it will never be possible to control a reality that is always emergent and changing. Therefore, the difference in the process of shaping and planning strategy is manifested in several dimensions: at the level of detail, time frame, objective, and planners' identity. Deliberate Strategy focuses on control while Emergent Strategy focuses on learning.⁷ The emphasis of Deliberate Strategy is on implementation and realization of the original intention, Emergent Strategy stresses new insights-in-the-making and adapting the plan to them.⁸ Organizational psychologist Karl Weick explained that, unlike the management approach that divides thinking from action in a dichotomous fashion, in which the latter begins only when the former ends, the approach of Emergent Strategy says that we try things, wait to see the outcome, and continue. There is no clear order in which analysis precedes interaction with the surroundings. This approach views the world not as a stable entity somewhere out there, waiting for us to take it apart and put it back together; rather, it sees reality as emerging while we constantly supply explanations and updates based on our past experience.⁹

Henri Minzberg describes the role of the leader who acts according to Emergent Strategy as someone who creates vision and perspective and helps focus the strategic effort, but who does not propose a detailed plan, and accordingly leaves room for a high degree of flexibility. Leaders of this type are described in the literature as individuals who are willing to take certain risks, albeit not excessive ones. The emergent leader 'is not a gambler or a speculator but is calculated. Unlike the bureaucratic manager, whose first question on being given a task is "What resources do I control?" the leader who adopts emergent strategy will ask "Where is the opportunity?"'¹⁰

Charles Lindblom presents a process of policy setting that is not orderly and controlled, according to the usual image, but rather disorderly and even somewhat chaotic. He describes a complex and unpredictable environment that cannot be anticipated in advance and does not permit control and predetermined strategy on a detailed level. Instead, he proposes an alternative process in which strategy is a learning process where the formation and implementation of strategy are two completely integrated processes.¹¹ 'Upper Echelon theory suggests' that the leader is the main focus of this

⁷Ionut C. Popescu, 'Grand Strategy vs. Emergent Strategy in the conduct of foreign policy' *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41/3 (2018), 446.

⁸Henri Minzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand and Joseph Lampel, *Strategy Safari* (US: Prentice Hall, 1998), 24, 213.

⁹*Ibid.*, 220–2.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 13.

¹¹Charles E. Lindblom, 'The Science of "Muddling" Through,' *Public Administration Review*, 19/2 (1959), 79–88.

learning, as his interpretation is a function of his experiences, values, and personalities. However, the leader role is also to enable and encourage learning by the entire system.¹²

The question that arises is how, under these conditions the organization is directed toward the realization of its goals. In this context, the concept of 'strategic intent' which '... sets general direction, defines emerging opportunities and provides a rallying cry for employees'.¹³ 'Effectuation Theory' suggests that entrepreneurs operate in highly unknown environment and therefore they embark on a different path of decision making than the standard planning method by using a system of constant interaction of assessing the resources available in order to achieve their goals, while continuously balancing these goals with the resources and actions.¹⁴ A manifestation of that might be March's study on leaders 'exploration and exploitation' in which 'managers pursue multiply and contradictory alternative line of action ... Adopting a line of action while being aware of alternative lines of action'.¹⁵

Long before management theory, in the field of military strategy the clearest exponent of the perception of strategy as emergent phenomena was Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.¹⁶ Following his inspiration, Clausewitz, Moltke adopted an approach that centered on the understanding of war as a phenomenon controlled by chance and luck, and the perception of strategy as a flowing and elusive concept. He wrote:

Strategy is a system of expedients. It is ... the continuous development of the original leading thought in accordance with the constantly changing circumstance ... Therefore no plan of operation extends with any certainty the first contact with the main hostile force.¹⁷

Since Moltke assumed that plans would go wrong, he argued that the military leader must rely on the commanders' initiative in locating and exploiting opportunities that arise amid the chaos on the battlefield and must trust the commander's evaluation of the situation on the ground.¹⁸ Colin Gray addressed the critique that was sometimes raised against this approach:

All too often Moltke is criticized unfairly by scholars and others who seize upon his apparently dismissive formula 'strategy is a system of expedients' while neglecting to appreciate its context. ... What Moltke was claiming, unexceptionally one would

¹²Donald C. Hambrick, 'Upper echelons theory: An update,' *Academy of Management Review*, 32/2 (2007), 334–343.

¹³Minzberg et al, *Strategy Safari*, 219.

¹⁴Saras D. Sarasvathy, *Effectuation: Elements of entrepreneurial expertise* (Massachusetts, US: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009).

¹⁵James G. March, 'Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning', *Organization science* 2/1 (1991), 71–87.

¹⁶Helmuth Von Moltke served as the Prussian chief of staff, and later as chief of staff of the army of unified Germany, (1857–1888).

¹⁷Daniel J. Hughes (ed.), *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (New York: Presidio, 1993), 47, 92.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 133.

think, is that one needs to be flexible in adapting to the dynamic reality of tactical circumstances all the while holding 'the original leading thought' the dominant strategic concept, plainly in view as a guiding light that may have to be trimmed ... under the pressure of events.¹⁹

It is not surprising that these ideas were developed early in the field of military strategy as the need for strategy arises when there is high uncertainty, frequent change and above all an adversary who is attempting to thwart your plans, as Clausewitz and Moltke emphasized. But while deliberate strategy prescribes leaders with various forms of practices and behaviors, the advice for leaders on how to apply emergent strategy is quite thin.²⁰

Ionut Popescu distinguished between traditional Grand Strategy making, which he identified as Deliberate Strategy, and Emergent Strategy in national security and foreign relations. In his study he identified and assessed the conditions under which one approach is preferable to the other. He observed the external environment, time horizon and domestic factors and the leader's style. Popescu concluded that under certain conditions the emergent approach is preferable, such as when the environment is less predictable and more uncertain, time span is short, political polarization and finally personal style of leadership.²¹

If this is what is required of strategic leaders, then what kind of qualities do they need to possess to successfully cope with such uncertain environment? Historian John Gaddis used Isaiah Berlin's famous metaphor that distinguished between the hedgehog and the fox. Hedgehogs are in-depth experts on a single topic and take a narrow view. Foxes, by contrast, split their attention among many topics superficially, but their view is broad. 'The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing', says the ancient Greek proverb that inspired Berlin's article. Gaddis claims that a successful strategist must be part fox, part hedgehog, and cites F. Scott Fitzgerald who said, 'The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function'. The strategist, Gaddis claims, needs to combine, within a single mind, the hedgehog's sense of direction and the fox's sense of surroundings while retaining the ability to function.²² He has a 'hedgehog-like plan and [he] modifies it as needed in a foxlike manner ... [he has] opposing ideas in his mind as he functions'.²³

¹⁹Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, 124.

²⁰A few studies have been done in management for example: Lowell W. Busenitz and Jay B. Barney, 'Differences between entrepreneurs and managers in large organizations: Biases and heuristics in strategic decision-making' *Journal of Business Venturing*, 1997, 9–30; Amar Bhidé, 'How entrepreneurs craft strategies that work' *Harvard Business Review*, 1994, 150–161.

²¹Popescu, 'Grand Strategy vs. Emergent Strategy', 451–456. A further analysis in: Ionut C. Popescu, *Emergent strategy and grand strategy: how American presidents succeed in foreign policy* (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2017).

²²John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (US: Allen Lane, 2018), 19–20.

²³*Ibid.*, 20.

Popescu points out that while the ideas of Emergent Strategy, as we have seen, have been present in the literature of strategy, unlike in business where the debate between the two schools is ongoing for years, no work in political studies or strategy has so far explicitly tested the two approaches against each other.²⁴ Whereas Popescu uncovered under which conditions each approach would be preferable, this study aims to take it a step further and to expose leadership principles that enable leaders to exercise emergent approach.

Dayan as an archetype of emergent strategy

Dayan's life was a constant struggle against forces that he could not control. Therefore, he developed an approach that perceived reality as ceaselessly changing, and decisions had to be changed with it. Dayan had no commitment to any ideology or set of principles other than the success of the Zionist endeavor. Everything he did was subject and examined in light of this intent. His biographer Mordechai Bar-On, who served as his chief of bureau, described him in the following way:

One of his most prominent characteristics was his extreme reservation about any subjugation to prearranged sets of ideologies. He was noted for his relentless aspiration to re-examine, without prejudice, the ever-developing and ever-changing reality . . . [Dayan] had no trouble changing his mind when circumstances turned out to be different than expected or when he realized he was mistaken. Nevertheless, he remained loyal his entire life to himself and to his fundamental values – his love for the land and for the Zionist enterprise. To these two values he devoted his life.²⁵

Indeed, there are many examples in Dayan's long career that exemplify his adaptive approach to events. In the early 1950s Dayan was the master mind behind Israel's retaliation policy. In 1956 he decided that the retaliation raids had lost their utility and instead he opted for a war against Egypt as the only means to improve Israel's security situation. During the Suez Crisis 1956 his cunning campaign design convinced Ben Gurion to join the Franco-English plot. When the Seventh Armored Brigade rushed into Sinai twenty-four hours ahead of plan, he was furious but then use them to his advantage. He later famously affirmed that it was 'better to be engaged in restraining the noble stallion than in prodding the reluctant mule.'²⁶ During the Six Days War Dayan was careful not to intervene in purely military matters – he intervened only where he believed military actions could make a direct impact on the political situation. Such was the case of the Old City in Jerusalem – Dayan gave direct

²⁴Popescu, *How American presidents*, 18.

²⁵Mordechai Bar-On, *Moshe Dayan A Biography 1915–1981* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers Ltd., 2014), 358, 359. (Hebrew).

²⁶Eitan Shamir, *Transforming command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, British, and Israeli Armies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 89.

orders not to use heavy artillery or air-force for fear of destroying Muslim holy places. He provided a few guidelines and limitations to the military – such as not to engage on multiple fronts simultaneously – focus on defeating the Egyptians first, not to capture Gaza or to reach the Suez Canal without specific permission.

In the heat of battle and rapid developments some of his guidelines had to be changed on the move. Dayan refused to give the order to capture the Golan from the Syrians despite mounting pressure both from the Prime Minister, the generals and the local Israeli population demanding action to halt 19 years of constant Syrian attacks. Early on the fifth day of the war, as it was winding down, Dayan was provided with new intelligence information – this led him to change his mind, without consulting Prime Minister Eshkol or Chief of Staff Rabin who were asleep, he phoned the IDF Northern Commander and ordered him to capture the Golan. Against his directives IDF forces reached the Canal, once there Dayan refused to bow to Egyptian military pressure to force Israel to withdraw from the canal. However, following the Attrition War he proposed an Israeli withdrawal from the canal in return for an end of hostilities in a move that surprised the Egyptians, the Americans and even his own government. Probably his most unexpected shift happened when he broke an Israeli political taboo by joining his own Labor party's long-standing nemesis, Menachem Begin's Likud, following assurances by Begin that he would be able pursue a diplomatic settlement with the Arabs, thus completing his transformation from a warrior to a diplomat.

Some of his critics argued that leaders should cling to one consistent line, whether of ideology or of policy. Dayan's famous response was 'only a donkey never changes its mind'. One of his closest advisors said Dayan had the rare ability to state, 'I said what I said, but circumstances are now changed, and conditions have developed differently than I thought, and I am therefore changing the policy'.²⁷ There are many anecdotes that illustrates this. For example, when General Ahron Yariv served as chief negotiator with the Egyptian Army following the cease fire that ended the fighting in the Yom Kippur war. Dayan criticized Yariv's slow process of delivery food and water to the encircled Egyptian 3rd Army. 'Go ahead ... go ahead' Dayan hurried Yariv. The next day Dayan instructed Yariv to slow down the delivery of supplies to the Egyptians. Yariv, who felt aggravated from Dayan's zig zag, protested 'Yesterday you rushed me now you are telling me to slow down, it doesn't make any sense'. Dayan replied 'today is a new day'.²⁸

Accordingly, his contemporaries and historians found it difficult to follow his reasoning and considered Dayan an enigmatic figure, less easily understood and harder to decipher. This may also explain the numerous arguments

²⁷ Sholomo Gazit, 'Moshe Dayan and the IDF' in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.), *Hostile Frontiers-Israel's Security Issues during its First Decades* (Israel: Efi Meltzer Press, 2017), 167–178, 168. (Hebrew).

²⁸ Amos Gilboa, *Mr. Intelligence – Ahrale Yariv* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot, 2013), 641–642. [Hebrew].

and misunderstandings regarding his decisions and actions. In his concluding thoughts in his Six Days War study, historian Michael Oren expressed this enigma:

When I study distinguished historical leaders, I get to know them quite intimately. I read their letters. But Dayan is an exception to this rule. The more I studied him, the less I seemed to feel that I knew about him. He was a man of polarized contradictions – impassioned and cold, creative and narrow-minded, fearless and cowardly – and his brain could contain far more than two contradictory opinions simultaneously he

What were Dayan's intellectual sources of influence that may have shaped his perception on reality? Dayan was raised on classical Russian literature and as an adult, he read primarily Hebrew poetry and showed an interest in the Kabbalah and the *Book of Splendor*, an esoteric enough field for someone who spent his life dealing with earthly matters and who tended to a pragmatic outlook. The Kabbalah understand the *shekhina* (God's essence) as having a dual essence riddled with contradictions – male and female, strict judgment and mercy, the son of David Messiah and the son of Joseph Messiah,²⁹ the fox and the hedgehog. That is to say, there are two models representing opposites. The fox has the power to shatter conventions, and outcomes are judged relative to the concrete, local context. The hedgehog represents the polar opposite: the desire for fixed, universally valid rules, regulations, and principles. Based on this view, the leader's role is to shake conventions when a dynamic reality turns these conventions into shackles, a handicap. A system-wide military strategist is tested by his ability to apply universal principles into context-specific action, even if that action stands in stark contradiction to those principles.³⁰ In this context Henry Kissinger offered an interesting take of Dayan, one that noted the polar opposites of his personality: he described Dayan as 'Israel's most original, realistic, and poetic leader.'³¹

To sum up some of Dayan's main characteristics and actions that qualify him as an emergent leader are:

- A long-term strategic goal/vision that served as a general guide.
- No commitment to any ideology or set of principles.
- Accepting that reality is constantly changing – and living and acting accordingly.
- Always examine situations in their specific context – two situations are never the same.
- Open to examining and testing new ideas and ways of action.

²⁹In Jewish tradition they represent two types of contradictory but completing Messiah, one is earthly and practical the other is spiritual.

³⁰I thank Maj. Gen. Gershon Hachohen, former head of IDF National Security College, for his insight on this point. Personal communication 2 October 2020, Tel Aviv.

³¹Gad Yaacobi, *Encounters in the Course of my Life*, (Jerusalem, Israel: Carmel 2009), 91. (Hebrew).

Dayan's leadership and management practices

In their concluding remarks in their work on strategy formulation, Mintzberg et al. ask: 'How do strategists reconcile the conflicting forces of change and stability? How do they maintain alignment and promote order? Efficiency pattern control while having to reconfigure and adapt, respond innovate and learn?'³² This section uncovers six leadership and management principles practiced by Dayan, allowing him to formulate his strategy according to Emergent Strategy.

Contextualized learning process

'If deliberate strategy is about control, then emergent strategy is about learning'³³ explains Mintzberg. Emergent Strategy requires constant adaptation, adaptation requires learning, therefore key to the emergent approach is how one learns. However, the learning should be in constant interaction with the surroundings, employing 'a pattern recognizer'³⁴ when each pattern is unique.

Dayan was criticized for his attitude to institutional learning. He had not been an outstanding student in various army courses and did not improve later when he studied for – and never finished – a BA at the Hebrew University. A noted exception was his attitude to the senior command course he took in the United Kingdom at British Armed Forces Senior Officers School which he considered invaluable. But Dayan was self-taught, as were most of Israel's leaders of that time, and he felt that his career in the military was a consequence of necessity rather than choice. Clearly, Dayan did not enjoy learning in a rigid, sterile classroom environment, but it would be false to think that he opposed learning and the accumulation of knowledge.

Dayan was curious about people and places. He kept an open mind, applied critical thinking, had a good imagination, and took nothing for granted. His approach to key strategic issues developed constantly. His close staff who followed him for decades described an almost completely different personality in each phase of his career growing out of his previous phase.³⁵

His approach to the study of war did not stem from an intellectual passion to understand war and its aspects as a universal phenomenon. Rather, it was an upshot of practical needs: how to resolve concrete political problems by

³²Mintzberg et al., *Safari Strategy*, 363.

³³Henry Mintzberg, *Tracking Strategies: Towards A General Theory of Strategy Formation* (New York: Oxford University Press 2008), 5.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 376.

³⁵Interview, Major General Shlomo Gazit, Gazit was the Former head of the Military Intelligence, former head of The Unit for the Coordination of Operations in the Territories and Dayan's Bureau Chief, Herzliya 10.07. 2018.

military means. On the other hand, he never felt the need to apologize for his career and described war as 'the most exciting experience a human being can have'.³⁶ These characteristics led him to visit South Vietnam as it fought with American assistance against the Communists, which afforded him an opportunity to be an outside observer of a complex confrontation in which he had no personal stake. It helped him develop his views on this type of war, so essentially different from what he knew from his IDF service and understand a superpower's strategic perspective.

As a man of action, Dayan's method of learning is best described by the concepts coined by organizational psychologist Donald Schön of 'the reflective practitioner' who 'reflects in action'. Schön explains that learning by observing depends on one's ability to observe an action in a way that leads to a long-term process of learning. It includes critical attention to the practical and theoretical values inherent in daily activities by examining actions reflectively and reflexively, leading the practitioner to a developmental outlook. Observation can be an important tool by which individuals learn from their own professional experience instead of from formal study or knowledge. According to Schön,

When someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context. He is not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique, but constructs a new theory of the unique case. His inquiry is not limited to a deliberation about means which depends on a prior agreement about ends. He does not keep means and ends separate but defines them interactively as he frames a problematic situation. He does not separate thinking from doing, ... Thus reflection-in-action can proceed, even in situations of uncertainty or uniqueness.³⁷

Shabtai Tevet, the biographer who spent much time with Dayan, claimed that Dayan's source of inspiration and originality came to him 'from within, from contexts and circumstances, not from extensive research in military doctrine or history ...'³⁸

For Dayan the context was vital. In 1937 young Dayan led a motorized patrol as part of the Jewish Auxiliary Police, in British Palestine. He received a field manual which he found completely unsuited to needs of his patrol. Dayan composed a new field manual based on his experience leading the patrol. He then sent it to the Haganah's commander Yaakov Dori.³⁹ Years later when he attended battalion commander course in 1950, he refused to plan a defensive line that would leave out Jewish settlement during a large defense

³⁶TV Thames, 1972, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzVrRStVo9k>, (accessed 15 October 2020).

³⁷Donald A. Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983), 68.

³⁸Shabtai Tevet, *Moshe Dayan – The Soldier, The Man, The Legend* (Jerusalem, Israel: Shoken, 1971), 415. (Hebrew).

³⁹*Ibid.*, 159.

exercise. His instructors told him to ignore the Jewish settlements, and for the sake of the exercise focus on the terrain. Dayan refused to ignore the local context and told his instructors that they can teach general doctrine in West Point but here in Israel it does not apply. His stubbornness paid off as new methods of territorial defense were devised.⁴⁰

Dayan's learning and his new ideas were developed and shaped by his natural curiosity and creativity, because he learned from every situation and experience. These created a circle of experimentation based on which he could create a framework for relating to the current situation and give a solution or idea that, at that point, could be a way of testing the waters. This was the proposal he made in one of his famous speeches, 'To take the plunge' about the negotiations with Egypt carried out after the War of Attrition, in which he explained that there was no way of predetermining everything, but rather that it was necessary 'to jump into the deep end'.⁴¹

Two proximate events exemplify well the way Dayan studied an emerging event. In both, Dayan's way of learning was similar, and it is possible that the first affected the second. The first event was his visit to Vietnam as a military journalist in 1966, when he wanted to get to know and understand the conflict from up close. This is how Dayan explained his decision to tour Vietnam:

After 25 years of security and five years of farming, this is the only war now taking place anywhere in the world. Hardly anyone among us has seen or taken part in a war of this scope. My primary expertise lies in security and just as an expert in plant disease would travel to observe plant diseases and the ways to treat them, I want to see and study the war in Vietnam and any possible ramification of it on the war in our region.⁴²

Dayan departed for Vietnam in July 1966. But he did not travel directly. First, he stopped in France and the UK where he listened to the opinions of French generals who had previously fought in Indo-China and met with Gen. Montgomery, the hero of el-Alamein. From there, he continued on to the United States where he met with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and other senior officials in President Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Everyone gave Dayan comprehensive briefings. From there, Dayan traveled on to Vietnam where he met with various commanders, though he insisted on being embedded on patrols in the jungles. He found himself under fire; he toured with a Marine platoon, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 1st Cavalry Division, which was reformed to become an air-mobile helicopter division. On

³⁹Ibid., 159.

⁴⁰Ibid., 350.

⁴¹Meir Boumfled, *To Take the Plunge*, (Israel: Efi Meltzer Press, 2017), 67. (Hebrew). Based on primary sources, Boumfled is the most in depth study on the failed negotiations during 1970–1973 to reach a diplomatic agreement between Israel and Egypt before the 1973 war.

⁴²Tevet, *Moshe Dayan – The Soldier, The Man, The Legend*, 550.

4 June 1967, after he was appointed defense minister and a day before the start of the Six-Day War, Foreign Minister Abba Eban read out loud a message from Secretary of Defense McNamara: 'Very much appreciate and personally respect Dayan who provided the most balanced report on Vietnam situation that has ever been brought to my attention'.⁴³

The second occurred in May 1967, during the pre-Six-Day War waiting period, when Dayan very much wanted to return to active IDF duty and serve in a command position, and was preparing himself for an army posting after a decade of absence from the military. To that end, he once again donned the IDF uniform and, in those weeks, visited IDF bases to study the army with which he had had no contact for a decade. As he had done as chief of staff and as a student of the Vietnam War, he toured the fronts, spoke with the rank-and-file and the commanders, and studied the army's preparedness and morale. In his diary, he wrote, 'That entire time, I toured IDF units in the south, north, and centre. From time to time, I would come home to Tel Aviv, listen to what was happening and respond'.⁴⁴ His tour of the army resembled his tour of Vietnam: he started with the senior commander and headquarters and systematically went down the ladder to lowest echelons, from the strategic to the tactical levels, where strategy is translated into action. 'I wanted to see the true IDF, what it could do and what it couldn't [...]. I found a much-improved IDF. It sent my soul soaring.'⁴⁵ Dayan emerged encouraged by his study; his certainty that the IDF would prevail increased. When he assumed his position as Minister of Defence, rather than as a military commander (a last-minute change brought about by Israel's internal politics), on June 1, he was ready.

Deciding and promoting priorities according to the 80-20 principle

In his various positions, Dayan applied the 80–20 method, also known as the Pareto principle.⁴⁶ This method avers that, in a system, one entity represents twenty percent of the factors responsible for a certain unwanted phenomenon, while another entity is responsible for eighty percent of the factors causing that phenomenon. Identifying the latter and improving it will result in an eighty percent improvement of the system's performance.

There is no way of knowing if Dayan was familiar with the Pareto principle, but in practice he acted as if he was. In all the positions he held, Dayan would identify one or two issues or challenges whose improvement would lead to an essential change. Having done so, he would from then on concentrate all his attention on that challenge. As chief of staff, the issue was leader's performance in battle and

⁴³Protocol of Minister Committee for Security Affairs, 4 June 1967, Israel State Archive, File No. EE0002.

⁴⁴Moshe Dayan, *Story of my Life* (Jerusalem: Dvir Publishing, 1976), 398. (Hebrew).

⁴⁵Yaakov Erez and Ilan Kfir, *Conversations with Moshe Dayan* (Tel Aviv, Israel: Masada 1981), 46. (Hebrew).

⁴⁶Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) was an Italian economist and political scientist who came up with the principle named after him.

carrying out retaliation operations (Dayan linked the two). In his last year in this position he focused on preparing the army for a confrontation with Egypt. In his years as defense minister, Dayan devoted his time to managing the territories occupied in 1967, to the point that some referred to him as 'the territories minister'. When the War of Attrition began, he had already established his policy on the occupied territories and he therefore shifted his focus to managing the long, complex Attrition War with Egypt (1969–1970). As foreign minister, Dayan concentrated on a political breakthrough with Egypt and, once that occurred, he shifted his attention to Palestinian self-rule.

Shlomo Gazit, who served as Dayan's first bureau chief when he was chief of staff and who would later head the Military Intelligence Directorate, described this as the opposite of a 'combing' approach. Other managers may use a comb to tease apart many issues simultaneously, but Dayan, according to Gazit, thought that while he was responsible for the full gamut of issues in his purview, he had a staff to handle those. 'I, Dayan, select one, maybe two issues. I focus on them only, to the exclusion of everything else ... That is where I can make a real difference to the work'.⁴⁷ At times, when Dayan thought a solution to a certain problem had been found and it was being resolved, he would stop focusing on that issue and let his subordinates continue with it. Gazit recalls preparing the IDF budget for 1954. Dayan had met with Moshe Kashti, the financial advisor to the chief of staff, for three months to work on it. When the job was done, Dayan told him, 'I hope not to see you until September. You do your thing and I'll do mine.' Apparently, Kashti did not take Dayan at his word, for the next morning he walked into the chief of staff's office to ask a question. Dayan promptly threw him out.⁴⁸

Empower your team and delegate

For this method to succeed, Dayan had to build, maintain, and surround himself with a team of skilled personnel to whom he could delegate authority and handle all other issues under his purview to which he paid no personal attention. His staff and the personnel at his bureau were both independent and also people who could read Dayan closely. Elyakim Rubinstein, who was Dayan's legal counsel when he served as foreign minister, recalls a practice he adopted: having realized that Dayan was impatient and quick to make a decision, which he would sometimes reverse the next day, Rubinstein would wait a day or two to execute certain orders to see if Dayan would change his mind.⁴⁹ Indeed, a popular saying Dayan often used among his staff was: 'Whatever I mess up in the morning, you'll clean up by evening.'

⁴⁷Gazit, 'Moshe Dayan and the IDF', 172–171.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 172.

⁴⁹Elyakim Rubinstein, *Paths of Peace* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1992), 208. (Hebrew).

Over the years, many who worked with Dayan at varying degrees of proximity spoke of his capacity for being cold, distance, and hard. Those who worked with him closely provide the opposite impression. In fact, the closer one was to him, the greater Dayan's trust and warmth, and those who found themselves in his innermost circle reciprocated those feelings. Dayan forged extremely close relationships with people who worked in his office and trusted them implicitly. Close members of his staff, including his secretary, Ne'ora Bar-Noah Matalon, Shlomo Gazit, and Mordechai Bar On, remained loyal to him as long as they lived. Other key personnel who worked with him, such as Meir Amit, Tsvi Gur, Matti Niv, and Aryeh Baron, as well as people who were involved with him in politics, matters of state, and legal issues, such as Zalman Shoval, Yosef Tchechanover, Gad Yaakobi, Haim Yisraeli, and Elyakim Rubinstein, represent only a partial list. What they have in common is that they all worked closely with Dayan on a daily basis as assistants and advisors at some point in his long career. All were gifted and independent thinkers who later on worked in key positions of their own. They agree that working with Dayan was a pleasant experience, based on mutual trust and respect. Dayan let all of them know they were free to disagree with him without fear of repercussions.

In his later years, when Dayan was foreign minister, he suffered gravely from headaches caused by the wound to his eye, and could therefore be impatient with those around him, but he always remained attached to his inner circle, as both Ne'ora Bar-Noah and Elyakim Rubinstein testify.⁵⁰ Gad Yaakobi, a close friend and assistant who would later serve as minister of the economy and Israel's ambassador to the UN, said the following of Dayan's attitude towards his intimates:

Dayan provided everyone who worked with him a great deal of freedom, a sense of initiative and independence, but he also made of point to give guidance. He was unforgiving of those who betrayed his trust. It was therefore easier for self-disciplined, rigorous mavericks to work for him than it was for weak and sloppy people. There were usually no barriers between him and those whose manner of work he appreciated, and he shared with them his deliberations and state of mind."⁵¹

When he became chief of staff, Dayan made a point of surrounding himself with a skeleton staff and maintained a small office with few employees and modest furnishings. Unlike his predecessor who maintained a luxurious office (relative to the times), Dayan insisted on a plain desk covered with a military blanket, and instructed that the air conditioner not be used – moves made to express solidarity with the soldiers in the field.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 221.

⁵¹Gad Yaakobi, *Grace of Time* (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2002), 200. (Hebrew).

Dayan surrounded himself with those who complemented his lacunae of which he was well aware. Officers such as Tsvi Tsur, Haim Laskov, and Yitzhak Rabin – all of which became later on COD – were appointed to positions because he recognized the organizational and force building capabilities they brought. Laskov challenged Dayan professionally in an intense debate over the role of the armored corps.⁵² Dayan's approach was a very interesting one: rather than impose his authority he opted for an open debate, a seminar where both sides would present their case so Laskov could have fair chance to convince the General Staff his proposition was better than Dayan's. Rabin, was a close friend and ally of Dayan's nemesis Yigal Alon. Nonetheless, Dayan appointed him to head the Training Division of the General Staff, a job that suited him. Dayan relied on Meir Amit to head the army's Operations Directorate to such an extent that he left him to lead the campaign in Kadesh while he himself rushed into the Sinai to be with the troops. Dayan said that he was completely convinced that Amit would make the very best decisions, the same as he would have done.

Amit described Dayan as 'a creative, impatient man who dominated and intimidated everyone he met. He knew what he wanted and demanded that his wishes be fulfilled at once'. According to Amit, Dayan projected authority and leadership, was a deep thinker, grasped things quickly, considered the long term, and analyzed situations with clarity while calculating surprising moves. Another of Dayan's important characteristics, says Amit, was his ability to tell the wheat from the chaff. Still, Amit notes, it was not easy to work with Dayan. 'He was restless. He abhorred wasting time and always wanted to quickly get to the main point. There were only a few people he was willing to listen to for long'.⁵³

Still, the people who worked most closely with Dayan experienced a different man, someone who was tolerant and appreciative towards his office personnel and nurtured and empowered them. He delegated authority to senior members of his staff as well as to people working in his office. Shlomo Gazit, for example, started out as bureau chief for Mordechai Maklef, the IDF's third chief of staff, where he participated in only one weekly meeting; his work consisted primarily of shuffling papers and handling correspondence. However, the moment Dayan took over, he decreed that his bureau chief would participate in all discussions and meetings and would furthermore be responsible for taking the minutes. He told Gazit: 'Once the discussion is over, I don't want to hear about it again. You're to distribute the summary.' According to Gazit, 'This was a revolution of the whole approach'.⁵⁴

⁵²On the debate see Meir Finkel, *The Chief of Staff: A Comparative Study of Six Aspects of IDF Commanders* (Moshav Ben-Shemen: Modan Publishing House and Ministry of Defense, 2018), 186–190. (Hebrew).

⁵³Meir Amit, *Head On*, (Tel Aviv, Ma'ariv, 1999), 39, 85. (Hebrew).

⁵⁴Quoted in Tevet, *Moshe Dayan – The Soldier, The Man, The Legend*, 380.

When Dayan was still a young, inexperienced head of the Operations Directorate, he contacted Aharon Yariv, an intelligent young officer (and future Military Intelligence chief), to propose he establish and command the Israel National Defense College. Yariv told Dayan that he lacked the necessary knowledge and experience to command such an institution. Israel was a newly formed state and therefore many of its leading posts were staffed by inexperienced people. Dayan answered: 'If [Yitzhak] Ben Zvi can be president, Maklef can be chief of staff, and I can be head of the Operations Directorate – you can be the commander of the Defence College'.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, it should be noted that many of his commanders, subordinates, and colleagues saw him as remote and unpredictable, whose responses were liable to be harsh and hurtful. In his career, Dayan left a trail of angry and aggrieved commanders, subordinates, and colleagues. Chief of Staff Maklef, who was Dayan's commander, said of him: 'He doesn't fight with others; he just cuts them off.'⁵⁶ This could have been said also by Yohanan Peltz, Dayan's second-in-command in Commando Battalion 89 in the War of Independence. Thus, it all comes down to when and whom you ask. Dayan had many faces.

Time management for maximum unpredictability

Dayan's time management method was very unusual. Time is managers' most highly prized asset. When it comes to managers' time, the literature speaks of 'attention management'. A manager's decision to devote time to a particular issue is critical, just as in battle a commander cannot be in two places at the same time. Today, the more senior a person's position is, the busier their schedule is, full of ceremonies, visits, tours, and other commitments. The time of a high-ranking officer or a CEO is often decided on several months into the future and reflects priorities and problems to tackled. Given that reality sometimes intrudes with sudden emergencies, some obligations are postponed to make room for the unexpected and the entire calendar shifts. It seems that that is how everyone operates, but not Dayan.

As both his bureau chief and personal secretary testify, Dayan as chief of staff insisted that his calendar be left open. He had two or three regular weekly appointments, such as the Friday morning get-together with the defense minister and the Sunday midday cabinet meeting. One day was set aside for one-on-ones with various senior commanders and another for visiting bases and other on-the-ground sites. Other than that, Dayan's calendar was blank and flexible, his schedule filling in mostly day

⁵⁵Tevet, *Moshe Dayan – The Soldier, The Man, The Legend*, 380.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 371.

to day.⁵⁷ Dayan's instruction to his secretary was to leave him a lot of free time to sit by himself in his office to think. Not only did this provide him the time he needed to mull things over, but it afforded him great flexibility to respond to new, unanticipated developments. This was undoubtedly the most obvious manifestation of Dayan's perception of reality as changing unceasingly and the futility of rigid planning. On any given day, he could therefore decide to visit a military base without giving prior warning to ascertain if the duty commanders were actually there and watch the soldiers coming back from an overnight exercise. Once a month, he would make planned visits to certain bases together with all IDF division heads to solve on the spot trans-organizational issues.⁵⁸ He never agreed to take a tour based on an itinerary planned by a local echelon who undoubtedly wanted to show certain things and skip others, and he was known to upend any set schedule.⁵⁹ This way, he always had time to meet to discuss sudden issues on the spot, should it be necessary. He would end his day in the early evening. Once, Shimon Peres asked him how he had so much time to spare. Dayan's answer was: 'I have a rule: any piece of paper I don't have time to read by six in the evening, I forget it exists. Whatever I manage by six – great. At six, my desk is clean and the problems are all gone.'⁶⁰

The extent to which having free time was important to Dayan is evidenced by the fact that he asked both Ne'ora Bar-Noah, his secretary in the 1950s, and Elyakim Rubinstein who worked with him more than twenty years later, to leave him quiet time for thought.⁶¹ Without it, Dayan was like a fish out of water. In later years, after he developed an interest in archeology, he would focus on gluing pottery shards together as a type of meditation or mindfulness practice that allowed him to muse. In the Yom Kippur War, he complained about noise in command centers, which made it impossible for him to think, and he criticized the military method whereby 'the top-ranking officer of a regional command is surrounded by his staff and doesn't have a second to think in peace and quiet . . . Perhaps there is something wrong with me, but until the last day of the war I preferred to skip the regional headquarters and instead meet directly at the command centers on the front.'⁶² At the Camp David negotiations with Egypt, during breaks, when delegation members sat together or played sports, he preferred to walk the trails in the woods by himself to be able to think.

⁵⁷Interview with Neora Matalon-Barnoach, Dayan's Personal Assistance, Herzliya Israel, 10 November 2018. Interview with Shlomo Gazit, Kfar Saba, Israel, 20 August 2018.

⁵⁸Neora Matalon-Barnoach, *Good place on the side* (Ra'anana: KIP – Kotarim International Publishing Ltd., 2009), 34–25. (Hebrew).

⁵⁹Shlomo, Gazit, *The Stick and The Carrot – The Israeli Administration in Judea and Samaria* (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan Publishers, 1985), 410. (Hebrew).

⁶⁰Tevet, *Moshe Dayan – The Soldier, The Man, The Legend*, 410.

⁶¹Rubinstein, *Paths of Peace*, 208.

⁶²Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life*, 621.

Use meetings to generate new ideas and then and turn them to action

An inevitable, routine task of a manager or military commander is holding meetings, which are a way to gather people in disparate positions whose functions somehow intersect, to exchange information, coordinate action, and most importantly make decisions. Meetings consume valuable hours multiplied by their number of participants. Therefore, when meetings are inefficient, the organization pays a steep price in both efficiency and effectiveness.

Dayan used his periodic gathering of senior personnel, such as the General Staff meeting, to consider and iron out essential and strategic questions. He encouraged open discussions, though once a decision was made, he made sure everyone was completely onboard with it, down to the last detail.⁶³ Minutes from General Staff meetings headed by Dayan show a consistent pattern. Dayan would announce the start of a free and open discussion. At the beginning of the discussion, he would update the General Staff on political developments and listen to updates on military matters. After that, he would present the central dilemmas facing the military, which he would formulate clearly and sharply in the form of a series of questions. Questions would mostly be connected to an emerging political reality that would directly affect military action. Sometimes, these would involve political constraints with implications for the military manner of conduct, such as choosing means and targets; at other times, these were the possible political ramifications of certain military actions.

One example dates to the three-year long War of Attrition. During those years, Dayan would open up the meeting with a central dilemma, such as what would force Egypt to hold its fire, he would present a number of options and then question the ramifications of every option Israel could possibly take or such as specify the type of response that would make the Soviets intervene. Dayan would then listen to what each one of the General Staff (GS) officers had to say, then summarize the military actions and their concomitant political ramifications. Sometimes, Dayan would summarize a political situation and then sketch out the significance for the army and ask the GS to prepare an appropriate plan to respond to the political scenario.⁶⁴

In other words, he functioned as an intermediary between political insights and considerations and possible military actions, never forgetting to note the political constraints. It seems that Dayan was aware that he, more than anyone else, could combine a broad political and diplomatic view with the application of matching military force. He generally made a point of

⁶³Sholomo Gazit, *Trapped* (Tel-Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1999), 74–75. (Hebrew).

⁶⁴For example, protocols of IDF General Staff deliberations 28 April 1969 and 5 May 1969 quoted in Shimon Golan, *The War to Stop The Attrition War* (Moshav Ben-Shemen: Modan Publishing House Ltd., 2018), 96,98.

intervening whenever he felt that a military action would have political consequences. For example, during the War of Attrition, he was personally involved in choosing and authorizing Egyptian targets, preferring to attack army facilities rather than civilian infrastructure. Operationally, it was simpler, and diplomatically he felt that an attack would not trigger too harsh a Soviet reaction.⁶⁵

Always be close to the action

Throughout history, many commanders made it a practice not to be satisfied with the reports their subordinates submitted, and preferred to spend time with the soldiers at the front in order to sense the atmosphere for themselves, see the condition of the equipment up close, understand the topography from the perspective of a soldier trying to surge ahead, and so forth. Of course, in terms of showing leadership and boosting morale, there is a great deal of value to a commander appearing among the rank and file.

Dayan was of the opinion that he had to see things for himself, unmediated and without filters, to form his own independent assessment. Indisputably, Dayan applied this principle to the greatest extreme possible. As noted already, as chief of staff, he toured bases and units, and during the period of retaliatory raids he would often wait for the units at the border. Much has already been written about the fact that, for most of the Sinai Campaign, he was in the field, traveling behind the troops; the fact that he was absent for long stretches from headquarters was also roundly criticized. In typical fashion, Dayan responded to his critics by saying, 'Perhaps they're right. But I cannot, or maybe do not want to, do things differently'.⁶⁶

Dayan's inclination to remain close to the where the action is did not change. As defense minister, he spent much time in the towns and villages of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, speaking with local inhabitants, taking a read of the atmosphere and listening to their problems and complaints. This earned him a great deal of respect and appreciation in the territories. At the time, terrorist cells were infiltrating the country from Jordan; the IDF set ambushes and engaged in chases; and Dayan, a fan of the field, could not help himself and joined such an ambush in which three smugglers were intercepted and killed. Dayan, who was armed, got off a few shots, but mostly reported that he enjoyed the break from the routine and being close to the land and nature.⁶⁷

In the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, he went into the field and visited the fronts. In the former, he did not have many opportunities to do so, but during the latter, he was at the front every day of the war, except for

⁶⁵Yoav Gelber, *The Time of the Palestinians: Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians 1967–1970* (Modi'in, Israel: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2018), 461–460. (Hebrew).

⁶⁶Dayan, *Story of My Life*, 288.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 536.

October 8 when the Chief of Staff, David Elazar (Dado), was there. Even as the nation's defense minister, he did not hesitate to reach the division command posts and crossed the Suez Canal, something that today is unthinkable. A few days before the war, he toured the northern front and ordered manpower be increased there. He did not undertake a similar tour of the southern front, something he rued after the war.⁶⁸ After overcoming the shock of the first two days of fighting, his many visits to the front were tremendously useful. At times, he made beneficial operational suggestions (with the reservation that these were merely 'advice' out of respect for the military chain of command). For commanders on the ground, such as Ariel Sharon and Avraham 'Bren' Adan, the visits were a shot in the arm, especially because Dayan made a point of keeping them abreast of the broader political developments. On the other hand, his loss of prestige and authority during the initial defeats of the 1973 was evident and his 'ministerial advice' rather than 'directives' became something his critics claimed was an attempt to avoid responsibility and a clear sign of his loss of confidence.

There is certainly a great deal of merit to unmediated study and proximity to events, and many of Dayan's decisions were based on realizations he came to during his tours. He could consequently respond quickly to any development before complications set in and it became difficult to find a solution.

Concluding remarks

As Mintzberg noted, 'no real-world strategy can be purely deliberate or purely emergent ... since one precludes learning and the other control, so the question becomes: what degree of which is appropriate when and where'.⁶⁹ These two analytical approaches sit on both ends of a wide continuum.

Israel has often been criticized for supposedly not having a coherent long-term grand strategy.⁷⁰ However, as a small country in a highly uncertain turbulent environment it had to quickly adapt and adjust. Add a polarized domestic political condition from 1967 onwards and the conditions for emergent strategy are set. In many ways Moshe Dayan epitomized this tendency and has probably represented the most extreme expression of it.

Dayan's leadership style was therefore deeply steeped in his historical era and the geostrategic requirement of the country he served. He lived in a time of tremendous change and volatility. Born in Palestine during World War I,

⁶⁸Bar Noah Matalon, 211.

⁶⁹Mintzberg et al. 363.

⁷⁰Yagil Henkin, 'What will Ensure our Existence', *Hashiloach journal for thought and policy*, 2 (December 2016), 1, <https://hashiloach.org.il/%d7%9e%d7%94-%d7%99%d7%91%d7%98%d7%99%d7%97-%d7%90%d7%aa-%d7%a7%d7%99%d7%95%d7%9e%d7%a0%d7%95/>

two years before the country was conquered from the Ottomans by the British, he experienced World War II, the establishment of the State of Israel, as well as the Israel-Arab wars under the pall of the Cold War. Major institutions were still under construction and incomplete during this time. Dayan as a leader was an expression of the *zeitgeist* of his era, his personal style fitted the conditions and challenges of the time. This is not always the case.

Leaders shape organizational culture by their behavior: what they pay attention to, their reaction to critical incidents, their role modeling, teaching and coaching, who they reward and promote are a few examples.⁷¹ Dayan molded the IDF and its commanders according to his style of leadership, the IDF under his leadership imbued a culture of flexibility and mission command that became its hallmark years after Dayan left office.⁷²

What can contemporary leaders learn from Dayan's example? First, they must be able to set a goal but be aware that reaching that goal might require changing routes mid-course more than once. They need to be aware that the current strategic environment requires that they implement an emergent strategy, in other words while they plan to focus on a certain front, they will likely be drawn to another while also needing to respond to an immediate crisis in a third area. Leaders should accommodate the idea that they cannot impose their will on reality because it is affected no less by rival wills and neutral forces too. That while it is important to make long-term plans it is most likely that even in a best-case scenario these plans will be only partially realized. Once this idea is fully accepted and internalized, the next step is to adopt leadership principles that provide a way to work with the emergent phenomena, to be able not only to respond to changes in reality and especially to threats that might derail the plan, but also to seize the opportunities these changes present. Nevertheless, this does not mean the leaders' sole responsibility is to act as fire extinguishers, moving from one crisis to the other. Leaders should possess a long-term commitment to the goal or vision that serves to guide them to their chosen destination even while tacking to accommodate the stormy sea and powerful contrary winds of the international and internal environments. But furthermore – they must be able to discern when the goal itself is no longer relevant and, if necessary, be able to replace it with a new goal to maintain the well-being of the community they serve.

Today, it is difficult to see senior generals leaving their calendars blank for days on end, deciding in the morning on spontaneous visits to various units or trading their fancy bureaus for a narrow office and simple desk covered with an army blanket and laying in an ambush with the rank and file. It is also impossible to engage in any of those proscribed acts Dayan allowed himself to do in a world less restricted by rules and regulations. The organizational

⁷¹Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 245–271.

⁷²Shamir, *Transforming Command*, 89.

and legal environment in which leaders operate today is much more complicated and rigid on many levels and laden with many more rules and regulations than in Dayan's era. However, adopting Dayan's leadership principles: Contextualized learning process, prioritizing attention according the 80–20 principle, delegate and empower, manage time for maximum unpredictability, use meetings to generate and test new ideas and lastly, strive to be close to the action, can serve as a useful blueprint for leaders today who accept that strategy formulation should be done according to emergent strategy school and would like to learn how to put this theoretical approach to practice.

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