Highlighted Works by Mackinder Forum Members

Weekly Geopolitical News Bulletin (Dec 20-26, 2025)

Geoeconomics

• China’s rare-earth curbs continue to bite despite an announced US–China “deal” — Market participants told Bloomberg that China’s restrictions on rare earths critical for permanent magnets and other applications remain in effect even after a Trump–Xi agreement earlier in the fall that was expected to ease access. The immediate significance is less about spot shortages than about continued uncertainty in availability, licensing, and downstream pricing power for a set of inputs that are hard to substitute at scale. The episode reinforces that “trade deal” language and operational export-control practice can diverge—especially when controls are framed as national-security instruments rather than commercial policy. Bloomberg’s framing is market-centric (availability, buyers, price impact); Chinese and US officials may emphasize strategic or security narratives that don’t map cleanly to market expectations.
  bloomberg.com
  
  
• Think-tank estimate claims China’s 2025 growth fell far short of Beijing’s target, spotlighting data credibility as a strategic variable — Rhodium Group estimated China’s 2025 growth at roughly 2.5–3%, well below the official “around 5%” target, arguing that late-year fixed-asset investment weakened sharply and that reported GDP components don’t reconcile cleanly with other indicators. Beyond the headline number, the geopolitical relevance is the widening gap between external analytic estimates and official reporting—complicating everything from investor risk models to trade-policy bargaining power. If foreign governments and firms discount official data more aggressively, Beijing’s signaling power over its own macro trajectory erodes, even if underlying fundamentals improve. Reuters’ write-up centers Rhodium’s methodology and the discrepancy; Chinese authorities typically contest such critiques, and other forecasters (including multilateral institutions) may land on different ranges.
  reuters.com
  
  
• Sri Lanka debt-relief calls intensify after Cyclone Ditwah, reopening climate–sovereign finance fault lines — A group of prominent economists (including Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz) urged a halt to Sri Lanka’s external debt repayments after Cyclone Ditwah killed hundreds and caused severe destruction, arguing the fiscal shock makes existing repayment schedules untenable. The story matters as a test case for whether climate disasters accelerate creditor flexibility—or instead harden repayment demands, pushing states toward emergency IMF financing and ad hoc bilateral support. The article also highlights the political economy of restructurings: even after prior deals, debt-service burdens can remain large relative to revenue, while private lenders may still profit depending on terms. The Guardian often foregrounds equity and climate-justice arguments; creditors and some policymakers may emphasize moral hazard and the precedent set for future restructurings.
  theguardian.com
  
• EU renews Russia economic sanctions to July 2026, underscoring durability of the sanctions baseline — The EU Council renewed the bloc’s economic restrictive measures related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine for another six months, extending the sanctions framework to 31 July 2026. While renewals are often procedural, they are geopolitically meaningful in a context where unity can be challenged by domestic politics, legal disputes, and retaliation risks—especially when sanctions intersect with frozen assets, energy flows, and third-country enforcement. The renewal also signals to partners and adversaries that the EU’s coercive toolkit remains anchored even as battlefield and diplomatic dynamics shift. As an official EU statement, the framing emphasizes legality and response to aggression; Russian officials and some non-EU states frequently dispute legitimacy and point to secondary economic effects.
  consilium.europa.eu
  
  
• ITIF argues US can expand power supply fast enough for data-center growth—if regulation and grid incentives shift — ITIF’s report contends that surging electricity demand—driven in part by data centers and AI—does not require “slowing data centers,” but rather accelerating grid capacity through a mix of supply-side upgrades (e.g., better utilization of existing lines) and demand-side flexibility (shifting non-time-sensitive loads off-peak). The key strategic implication is that energy infrastructure is becoming a competitiveness constraint: states able to expand generation/transmission and manage peak load will capture more of the AI/data-center buildout. The report also emphasizes regulatory and permitting reforms, reflecting a US policy debate about bottlenecks and time-to-build rather than just cost. As an innovation-policy think tank, ITIF’s bias tends toward pro-growth, pro-technology solutions; environmental groups or local stakeholders may push back on the feasibility or externalities of rapid buildout.
  itif.org

Military Developments

• China sanctions US defense firms over Taiwan arms sales, signaling the “legal/financial” layer of deterrence — China announced sanctions against a set of US defense companies tied to arms sales to Taiwan, pairing diplomatic protest with measures designed to raise reputational, legal, and commercial risk. Even when enforcement effects are limited, the action communicates resolve and domestic political posture while warning third parties—especially suppliers and insurers—about exposure. The step also illustrates how Taiwan-related escalation often unfolds through incremental moves rather than a single dramatic action: arms packages, counter-sanctions, new operating patterns, and sharper rhetoric. AP’s reporting frames the move within the recurring Taiwan arms-sales cycle; Chinese official narratives typically present the issue as sovereignty and anti-secession, while US and Taiwanese officials emphasize deterrence and the status quo.
  apnews.com
  
• Japan approves record defense budget, keeping pressure on regional military balances — Japan’s cabinet approved a record defense budget (reported at about ¥8.7 trillion), continuing a multi-year trajectory of higher spending aimed at missiles, air defense, and maritime/ISR capabilities. The move is strategically significant not only for procurement but for doctrine: sustained increases embed a higher baseline for readiness and stockpiles, and they signal to allies and adversaries that Japan’s post-2022 defense posture shift is structural. The budget debate also matters domestically—how Japan finances higher defense outlays affects political durability and coalition consensus. AP’s coverage is generally straight and data-driven; critics within Japan often warn about debt and constitutional/pacifist constraints, while supporters emphasize deterrence amid China’s buildup and North Korea’s missile programs.
  apnews.com
  
  
• India tests K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile, reinforcing sea-based deterrence signaling — India test-fired the K-4 SLBM from the nuclear-powered submarine Arighaat, according to NDTV, highlighting continued maturation of India’s sea-based deterrent and second-strike posture. Operationally, reliable SLBM performance matters for survivability and crisis stability—especially as India weighs simultaneous pressures from China and Pakistan. Strategically, the test also reinforces a broader Indo-Pacific trend: more states are prioritizing undersea platforms, long-range missiles, and layered deterrence over purely conventional force expansion. NDTV’s reporting reflects Indian national-security framing and tends to emphasize capability milestones; external analysts may debate readiness levels, patrol patterns, and whether such tests shift escalation dynamics in practice.
  ndtv.com
  
  
• Pentagon assessment highlights China’s carrier ambition—nine carriers by 2035—tightening the maritime competition timeline — A USNI summary of a Pentagon report says China aims for nine aircraft carriers by 2035, suggesting sustained investment in blue-water power projection and carrier air wing maturation. The headline number matters less than the implied operational tempo: more hulls enable persistent presence, training cycles, and crisis response options across multiple theaters simultaneously. Even if capability and experience lag numbers, the trajectory pressures regional navies to invest in anti-ship, undersea, and long-range ISR/strike systems—shaping procurement choices for years. USNI’s framing is defense-institutional and closely tied to US military reporting; Beijing often argues its buildout is defensive and proportionate, while neighbors focus on coercion risks in the South/East China Seas and around Taiwan.
  news.usni.org
  
  
• Researchers say Russia is likely deploying nuclear-capable Oreshnik missiles in Belarus, expanding strike geometry — Researchers cited by Reuters assessed (using satellite imagery) that Russia is likely positioning nuclear-capable hypersonic Oreshnik systems at a former airbase near Krichev in eastern Belarus, a move that could widen Russia’s reach across Europe. The significance is both military and political: basing in Belarus reduces warning times and embeds Belarus deeper into Russia’s deterrence posture, raising escalation sensitivity during crises. Experts quoted in the report suggest the deployment may be driven more by signaling and deterrence than by clear battlefield advantage, particularly as arms-control frameworks fray. Reuters is relatively neutral; Moscow and Minsk typically frame such moves as responses to NATO deployments, while NATO members argue it heightens instability and reinforces the case for air/missile defense investment.
  reuters.com
  
  

Political and Diplomatic Developments

• Zelensky plans Florida meeting with Trump, putting ceasefire bargaining back at the center of alliance politics — Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is set to meet US President Donald Trump in Florida, a high-visibility engagement likely to focus on war aims, negotiating parameters, and the balance between military support and diplomatic off-ramps. Such meetings matter because they shape expectations: allied publics, Russia, and Ukraine’s domestic audience watch for signals on red lines (territory, security guarantees, sanctions relief) and on timelines. Even small changes in US messaging can shift European coordination and Ukrainian leverage—especially if interpreted as pressure to trade land for peace or, conversely, as a recommitment to military aid. TBS’s framing tends to highlight diplomatic stakes and public signaling; competing narratives will portray the meeting as either prudent peacemaking or coercive leverage on Kyiv.
  tbsnews.net
  
  
• Report says Putin signaled openness to a territory swap, hinting at tactical flexibility without conceding strategic goals — Reuters, citing Kommersant, reports Putin indicated Russia might be open to a territory swap as part of a Ukraine deal. If accurate, the key point is not that Moscow’s objectives have softened, but that it may be exploring transactional configurations that preserve core gains while seeking sanctions relief or a durable pause in fighting. Territory-swap talk can also be instrumental—used to test Western and Ukrainian reactions, fragment coalition consensus, or reset negotiation narratives ahead of a new military phase. Reuters’ account is conditioned on reported sourcing and may evolve as officials clarify; Ukraine’s leadership historically rejects forced concessions, and European governments vary on how much compromise they believe is feasible without inviting future aggression.
  reuters.com
  
  
• Brazil’s Lula warns against US intervention in Venezuela, reflecting a widening hemispheric split on coercion — Reuters reports President Lula warned that US intervention in Venezuela could be “catastrophic,” underscoring how Latin American powers often diverge from Washington on the legitimacy and risks of coercive pressure. The diplomatic significance is that regional opposition can complicate coalition-building, basing/access, and sanctions enforcement—especially if maritime interdiction or “quarantine” actions are involved. Lula’s stance also signals to Caracas that it can seek regional political cover even amid economic strain and external pressure, while reminding Washington that “maximum pressure” approaches can carry second-order diplomatic costs. Reuters’ presentation is relatively straight; Venezuelan officials are likely to amplify supportive regional statements, while US officials emphasize rule enforcement and counter-smuggling/security rationales.
  reuters.com
  
  
• Syria welcomes repeal of Caesar Act sanctions, testing how fast normalization can translate into reconstruction flows — The National reports Syria welcomed the repeal of the 2019 Caesar Act sanctions law, describing it as a step toward reintegration and reconstruction. The key geopolitical question is sequencing: whether legal repeal rapidly changes bank risk tolerance, project insurance, and humanitarian/early recovery pipelines—or whether secondary restrictions, compliance caution, and political conditions still slow capital movement. Regional states seeking influence in post-war Syria may interpret the shift as an opening to compete for access, contracts, and security partnerships. The National is UAE-based and often reflects Gulf-region strategic priorities; US and European perspectives may stress conditionality and monitoring, while Syrian officials emphasize sovereignty and rapid reconstruction.
  thenationalnews.com
  
  
• ITIF urges a “national power industries” strategy to counter China’s techno-economic campaign — ITIF argues that advanced, globally traded sectors—semiconductors, aerospace, AI, and related supply chains—function as “wellsprings” of national power, and that China’s approach (subsidies, market capture, tech transfer pressure, and IP theft) should be treated as strategic competition rather than normal trade. The report’s main claim is that older policy doctrines (pure liberalization, engagement, or complacency about innovation leadership) are insufficient, and that the US should adopt a coherent industrial strategy aligned to security and competitiveness. The analytic value is in framing industrial policy as statecraft; the debate is over tools (export controls, subsidies, investment screening) and their global spillovers. ITIF’s bias is generally pro-US industrial strategy and innovation; free-trade purists and some allies worry such approaches can escalate subsidy races and fragment technology ecosystems.
  itif.org

Geostrategic Flashpoints

• Sweden boards a sanctioned Russian vessel, heightening Baltic Sea enforcement and escalation sensitivity — The Financial Times reports Sweden boarded a sanctioned Russian vessel off its coast, an incident that sits at the intersection of sanctions enforcement, maritime law, and regional deterrence. The Baltic has become a high-friction space where routine actions—inspections, cable protection, naval shadowing—carry outsized escalation risk because actors interpret intent through a security lens. Boarding actions also test alliance coordination: whether legal authorities, coast guards, and navies share intelligence and rules of engagement coherently across jurisdictions. The broader implication is a “thicker” security environment for Baltic shipping and infrastructure, with greater likelihood of incidents driven by enforcement ambiguity rather than deliberate attack. FT’s reporting is generally rigorous; Russian narratives often frame such actions as harassment, while Nordic governments emphasize sanctions compliance and maritime security.
  ft.com
  
  
• UK Navy warns of a deep-sea infrastructure threat from Russia, elevating cables/pipelines into frontline strategic assets — The Financial Times reports the Royal Navy warned about Russian threats to undersea infrastructure, reflecting Europe’s rising concern that seabed cables and pipelines are attractive targets due to high impact and plausible deniability. The strategic consequence is that “gray-zone” risk is increasingly defined by infrastructure vulnerability rather than territorial seizure: disruption can impose immediate economic and political costs without crossing obvious red lines. Protection is hard—assets are vast, monitoring is imperfect, and attribution can be slow—pushing states toward new surveillance architectures, rapid repair capacity, and stronger signaling about retaliation thresholds. FT’s framing emphasizes Western security assessments; Russia typically denies hostile intent and points to NATO activity near its borders, which can create a narrative contest even when technical evidence is strong.
  ft.com
  
  
• Two CMA CGM ships transit the Suez Canal, suggesting partial de-risking of Red Sea routes — Reuters reports two CMA CGM vessels navigated the Suez Canal in a sign that some operators are cautiously reassessing Red Sea risk and insurance calculus after prolonged disruption. Even limited resumptions are geopolitically meaningful because they affect transit time, freight rates, and the strategic leverage created by chokepoint insecurity. The shift also tests whether protective naval deployments and revised routing practices are restoring “good enough” confidence—or whether a single attack can reverse the trend and re-impose Cape routing. Reuters’ framing is market-logistics oriented; regional actors and militant groups may emphasize political objectives, while shipping firms prioritize probabilistic risk rather than absolute safety.
  reuters.com
  
  
• Iran seizes an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, re-energizing maritime risk at the world’s most important oil chokepoint — AP reports Iran seized a foreign oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, claiming it carried smuggled fuel and detaining crew members. Whatever the smuggling facts, tanker seizures in Hormuz routinely generate strategic consequences because they raise the perceived probability of tit-for-tat actions, insurance spikes, and naval posturing—especially amid broader Iran–West tensions. The incident also reinforces the “law enforcement vs. coercion” ambiguity Iran often leverages: actions can be framed as anti-smuggling while still signaling deterrence and control over escalation ladders. AP’s reporting relies on Iranian state media and officials for initial claims; external governments may dispute details, and markets tend to react to the possibility of disruption rather than confirmed interruption.
  apnews.com
  
  
• Russian strikes on Odesa keep Black Sea access contested, sustaining risk to ports and export corridors — The Guardian reports Russia launched large-scale drone and missile attacks on Odesa, a critical Black Sea port, as Ukraine framed the strikes as evidence Moscow intends to prolong the war. The geostrategic relevance is that port attacks are not just tactical: they shape export capacity, insurance costs, and the viability of maritime corridors—linking battlefield dynamics directly to commodity flows. Persistent pressure on port infrastructure also forces Ukraine and partners to invest in layered air defense and dispersal strategies, while giving Russia a lever that sits between total blockade and normal trade. The Guardian often foregrounds humanitarian and accountability narratives; Russian accounts typically emphasize military targets and deny civilian intent, creating divergent interpretations of legitimacy even when damage to port infrastructure is visible.
  theguardian.com

Terrorism and Conflict

• Deadly Palestinian attack in northern Israel highlights persistent multi-front volatility — Reuters reports two people were killed in a Palestinian attack in northern Israel, underscoring how episodic violence continues even as attention cycles between Gaza, the West Bank, and broader regional diplomacy. Such attacks can rapidly reshape political constraints on negotiations, intensify security measures, and trigger retaliatory operations—often with spillover into regional actors’ decision-making. The strategic effect is cumulative: repeated incidents harden threat perceptions and reduce space for de-escalation, even if each event is locally contained. Reuters’ reporting is typically cautious and fact-forward; Israeli and Palestinian political actors often compete to frame attacks as either terrorism, resistance, or the predictable product of occupation and retaliation, which can pull external audiences toward sharply different causal narratives.
  reuters.com
  
  
• Pakistan attack kills police personnel, sustaining the internal-security drag on governance and regional stability — Reuters reports five Pakistani police were killed in a combined gun-and-bomb attack, reflecting ongoing militant operational capacity and the persistent security burden on Pakistani institutions. Beyond the immediate casualties, such incidents strain morale, divert resources, and fuel political contestation over counterterror priorities—especially when attacks cluster or hit symbolic targets. The broader risk is cyclical: insecurity discourages investment and governance capacity, which can create permissive conditions for further militant recruitment and violence. Reuters’ framing is incident-focused; Pakistani officials often stress foreign sponsorship or cross-border sanctuaries, while independent analysts debate local drivers, factional fragmentation, and the effectiveness of current counterterror models.
  reuters.com
  
  
• US strikes ISIS-linked militants in northwest Nigeria as civilians describe shock and fear — AP reports villagers in Nigeria described homes shaking and skies lighting up after US airstrikes targeted an ISIS camp, illustrating how counterterror operations can have immediate psychological and political impacts even when civilian casualties are not confirmed. The action signals US willingness to project force against transnational jihadist nodes beyond the Middle East, while also highlighting the operational constraints of remote strikes: intelligence quality, sovereignty politics, and post-strike verification. Regionally, the strikes may shift militant movement patterns and prompt adaptation, including dispersal and retaliation against local partners perceived as cooperating with foreign militaries. AP’s reporting centers local accounts; US officials emphasize targeting and threat reduction, while militant propaganda may exploit fear and disruption regardless of actual damage.
  apnews.com
  
  
• Jordan joins US strikes on ISIS targets in Syria, reflecting regional buy-in for counter-ISIS operations — AP reports Jordan’s air force participated in US strikes on Islamic State targets in Syria, a noteworthy indicator that regional partners are willing to take visible kinetic roles rather than limiting support to intelligence or border defense. The strategic relevance is twofold: it reinforces deterrence against ISIS reconstitution and signals that neighboring states see spillover risk as sufficiently high to justify direct action. At the same time, overt participation can increase domestic political sensitivity and elevate retaliation risk—especially if strikes are framed as foreign intervention rather than counterterror defense. As with many Syria-related actions, narratives diverge: partner governments stress counterterror necessity, while critics point to sovereignty and the risk of escalation in a crowded battlespace.
  apnews.com
  
  
• M23 fighting persists in eastern DRC despite a declared deal, keeping Great Lakes instability entrenched — Al Jazeera reports that “peace prospects” remain dire as M23 continues fighting in the DRC despite a deal, highlighting the repeated pattern of agreements failing to constrain armed groups or address external support dynamics. The conflict’s regional dimension—particularly allegations of cross-border backing and the security dilemmas of neighboring states—keeps escalation risk alive even when headlines fade. Persistent violence also undermines humanitarian access and state authority, while driving displacement that can destabilize wider areas. Al Jazeera often emphasizes human impact and regional politics; governments implicated in support networks frequently deny involvement, and independent verification can be difficult in contested zones.
  aljazeera.com

WMD & CyberWarfare

• North Korea showcases apparent progress on a nuclear-powered submarine, strengthening second-strike narratives — AP reports North Korea displayed signs of progress on building a nuclear-powered submarine, with Kim Jong Un visiting the site—another step in Pyongyang’s long-running push for survivable nuclear forces. A nuclear-powered platform (if operational) would change patrol endurance and complicate detection, potentially increasing crisis instability by raising uncertainty about where nuclear assets are located. The broader relevance is strategic signaling: even partial progress can be used to deter and to pressure rivals for concessions, independent of near-term deployability. AP’s reporting reflects visible imagery and official statements; outside analysts often caution that technical hurdles are significant and timelines uncertain, but the direction of travel still shapes threat perceptions in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington.
  apnews.com
  
  
• Pentagon report suggests China’s nuclear warhead growth has slowed, but expansion continues and signaling shifts with it — The Washington Post reports the Pentagon assessed China’s warhead growth has slowed, with the arsenal remaining in the “low 600s,” while still projecting movement toward ~1,000 warheads by 2030. The strategic issue is not only numbers but posture: even a slower growth rate can coincide with qualitative improvements (low-yield options, survivability, readiness) that affect deterrence stability and escalation risk. The report’s “softer tone,” as described, also matters as signaling—especially if aligned with a Trump push to stabilize tensions while sustaining competition over Taiwan, tech controls, and regional posture. The Post’s national-security reporting can reflect US institutional perspectives; Beijing typically rejects US assessments and emphasizes “no first use,” while skeptics argue transparency gaps limit confident conclusions.
  washingtonpost.com
  
  
• Iran conducts missile drills across multiple cities amid heightened tensions, with verification uncertainty — Reuters reports Iranian state media circulated claims and videos of missile drills in multiple cities (including Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad), while noting Reuters could not independently verify the footage. The drills matter because they communicate readiness and can serve as deterrent signaling after regional conflict episodes—especially when paired with rhetoric about the non-negotiability of Iran’s missile program. They also raise the risk of misperception: external actors may interpret exercises as preparation for escalation, while Iran frames them as defensive. The reporting highlights a recurring information problem in WMD environments—states use controlled media and selective imagery, while outsiders struggle to validate technical details quickly.
  reuters.com
  
  
• Pro-Russian hackers claim cyberattack on France’s postal service, illustrating “persistent disruption” tactics — AP reports a pro-Russian hacker group claimed responsibility for a cyberattack on France’s postal service, part of the broader pattern of politically motivated cyber operations targeting public-facing services. Even when attacks are short of catastrophic, the strategic value can be high: eroding trust, imposing recovery costs, and demonstrating reach—especially during periods of geopolitical tension. Such incidents also test attribution and proportional response thresholds; governments must decide whether to treat attacks as criminal disruptions, hostile state-linked activity, or something in between. AP’s reporting typically distinguishes claims from confirmed attribution; Moscow-aligned actors often deny state involvement, and technical forensics can lag behind public narratives.
  apnews.com
  
  
• ITIF warns semiconductor export controls may backfire economically and technologically, strengthening non-US competitors — ITIF argues that broad semiconductor export controls on China can reduce US chipmakers’ revenue, shrink R&D capacity, and shift market share to South Korean, EU, Taiwanese, Japanese, and Chinese firms. Its modeling highlights potential first-order losses (sales and jobs) and second-order effects (slower innovation) that could weaken long-term competitiveness, even when controls aim to protect security advantages. The report is useful as a counterweight to purely security-driven arguments, emphasizing that “denial” strategies can impose costs on the denying side. ITIF’s bias tends toward industry and innovation priorities; national-security hawks and some allied governments argue that economic costs are justified to slow adversary military capability, so the central dispute is over how to price security risk versus commercial harm.
  itif.org